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Abstract  
       This study aims to explore whether the types of Egyptian public diplomacy, if 
any, follow strategies, content, and priorities of new public diplomacy by analyzing 
public diplomacy strategies followed by the two of main informational bodies in the 
Egyptian state: the State Information Service (SIS), and the public diplomacy division 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The study advances a theoretical framework 
designed to help find a connection between strategies followed by public diplomacy 
institutions and agenda-building function of those institutions. The analysis reflected 
the lack of strategic  planning in the two institutions to reach and influence foreign 
publics. Findings proposed that the main communication strategies in the SIS and 
MFA related to media relations and adopting reactive approaches to counter negative 
media coverage about the country in foreign media. A set of recommendations were 
introduced in a search for enhanced public diplomacy structure with more effective 
strategies to properly communicate with the international community.  
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Chapter One 
The Study Relevance and Significance  
Across history, people around the world, in Africa, the Arab world, and even 
beyond oceans, have been fascinated with the prestigious history of Egypt, its 
cultural precedents, and its central role in human civilization and world trade. In the 
1950s, Nasser's Egypt amazed the whole region by adopting an independent foreign 
policy that advocated great causes such as the Arab unity, national liberation, and 
anti-colonization movements in African countries, which fostered regional 
development and cooperation (Hamzawy 2010; Shama 2009). The rise of Egyptian 
soft power in that era was enough to prevail over the tripartite aggression carried out 
against Egypt in 1956, despite the huge differences between the aggregate of hard 
power capabilities of the three predators and that of the prey. Fifty years later, things 
have extremely reversed when the main question in Egyptian public discourse 
become: How to defeat Al-Jazeera. The leverage of a satellite television channel like 
Al-Jazeera, with minimum hard power capacities, that has over Egypt may embody 
the dramatic decline in Egyptian soft power over the past five decades (Shama, 
2009). 
  In Simon Anholt’s article on media and national image, the international 
advisor on nation branding and public diplomacy and the Creator of National Brands 
Index (NBI), put Egypt within the list of the thirty most well-known counties across 
the world. However, he categorizes it as a one of those countries that are well known, 
yet are not much admired, as they once enjoyed a high profile, and now they no 
longer deserve it (Anholt, 2009). However, the recent uprisings, including the two 
main revolutionary waves in January 2011, and June 2013 can provide a golden 
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chance for Egypt to regain its legacy as an iconic model for peaceful revolution and 
reform.  
 The story of Egyptian freedom fighters, who took to streets in thousands or 
maybe millions, in some narratives, two times in only three years, toppling two 
autocratic and theocratic regimes, respectively could impress the whole world for 
years to come. Nevertheless, a great story without great storytellers remains 
irrelevant, insignificant, and even subject to distortion.  
            Indeed, the worldwide media coverage of the Egyptian scene after the 30th of 
June revolution has illustrated the failure of the Egyptian state to present its own story 
to the international public opinion. The majority of foreign media presented one-sided 
narratives in which distorted and polarized coverage was evident (Shukrallah, 2013; 
Abou Bakr, 2013; Hamdy, 2015). The Egyptian media would have created more 
objective, balanced and honest coverage to counter West-supported Muslim-
Brotherhood narrative. Egypt's diplomatic channels, informational agencies, and 
mainstream media have remained muddled, incompetent, and even defenseless in 
dealing with the misinformed, zealous coverage and interpretation of the events 
provided by a host of influential newspapers, TV networks, think tanks, and NGOs 
across the world. 
 Going beyond the 30th of June scene to address Arabs' inability to articulate 
their own story in more internationally recognizable terms and concepts, in a way that 
identify the strategic requisites of their nations' foreign policy, led to the absence of 
Arab narrative, except the Qatar-based Aljazeera. That can be one of the main reasons 
behind the ongoing biased and misguided western coverage of Middle Eastern issues 
and challenges. To illustrate, western media and experts are used to regarding things 
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through their subjective perspectives, personal interests, and above all prejudices. For 
the international community, it is not comprehensible, or even favorable to see such 
quick popular uprising of million of Muslims against what is so-called “moderate 
Islamic regime”, after only one year in office. The post-9/11 Western narrative is 
based on the notion that Islam is the dominated identity of Muslim aggregates, and the 
main paradigm to understand their political, social, and cultural norms and behavior 
(Shukrallah, 2013). That is why American policy makers and their Western allies 
have favored the up-and-coming Islamic regimes over the semi-secular Police States 
that has proven to be incompetent and even weak in dealing with the growing bodies 
of terrorism across the region. Therefore, no one can accuse them of intentionally 
wanting to harm Egypt.  However, the main question remains what about the 
Egyptian narrative; the story of the Mediterranean country that has at least a triple 
identity; the Arab, African and Muslim populations; and the Middle Eastern center of 
culture and civilization? If the real identity of Egypt, including its complex social 
structures, intellectual diversity, dynamic agencies, popular arts and pioneers of 
Islamic modernism, have been efficiently communicated and presented to 
international public opinion, would have the 30th of June scenario been easily 
expected or at least understood once it happened? Simply said, if foreign publics 
across the world had heard before about the longstanding, famous Egyptian proverb 
stating that "with every hour devoted to your God, make another one for yourself", 
they would have understood the uniqueness of the Egyptian society, and their 
governments would have definitely changed their position toward the changes 
occurring in Egypt. 
  To emphasize the power of international publics and its impact on the fate of 
nations, Simon Anholt (2006) suggests, "The only remaining superpower is 
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international public opinion".  How a country perceived and projected by foreign 
publics in other countries can affect a country's standing in the international market, 
and global affairs, as well as its mutual relations with other counties. The need for 
counties to cultivate and convey a positive image to the rest of the world has been 
always a major component of government agendas. Public diplomacy that targets 
minds and hearts of foreign populaces has been common practice of many 
governments around the globe, especially in the Western sphere. In developed 
countries, public diplomacy has entered a phase of institutionalization and full-scale 
development through well-organized government structures, long-term strategies, and 
well-designed programs and activities as well as stable budget allocations. There is 
growing literature body on American public diplomacy, its strategies, practices and 
implications through different times: during and after cold war, after 9/11 events, etc. 
(Browne 1976; Cull 2008; Rosenberg 2006; Satloff 2004). Europeans and others 
utilize public diplomacy strategies and activities to improve their economy, promote 
their cultures and achieve foreign policy goals. By virtue of its capacity to address a 
great number of cross-culture threats, and opportunities,  public diplomacy becomes a 
communication instrument widely used in governance and international relation. 
George (2008) states that "public diplomacy is used by states, and non-states actors to 
understand, engage, and influence foreign public on wide range of issues related to 
promotion of values and identities, conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence, 
governance and democracy, even economic growth and distribution of goods and 
services." 
The Significance of The Study  
      This study makes significant contribution to the research of public diplomacy in a 
non-western context by filling the gap in the literature that focuses mostly on the 
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practice of public diplomacy in western world in which Arab countries are usually 
addressed as target rather than advocate nation. In fact, a review of public diplomacy 
literature highlights a relative scarcity in academic writings discussing public 
diplomacy in developing countries. When it comes to public diplomacy scholarship, 
most of developing countries fall at the receiving ends; as target rather than advocate 
countries (Glal 2010; Douglas& Neal 2013). Few studies focus on the practical 
relevancy of public diplomacy and soft power utilization in developing countries in 
general, and the Middle East in particular (Khakimova 2013; Mouawad 2013; Ndoye 
2009). 
          Nevertheless, the recent developments linked to the Arab Spring, raise 
questions about Arabs' capacity to create their own narrative, cultivate a positive 
image, and develop a new approach to communicate with the international 
community. The thesis will tackle this issue by reflecting on the current status of 
Egyptian public diplomacy, its institutions, strategies, and activities, as well as 
challenges and potentials of its applicability. The main purpose of the study is to 
explore whether the types of Egyptian public diplomacy, if any, follow strategies, 
content, and priorities of new public diplomacy that keep pace with what materializes 
in the new globalized world, in which information and communication technologies 
dramatically change the international arena, or not. This study is considered an 
empirical study aiming at strengthening the efficiency of public diplomacy practices 
and institutions in Egypt. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework 
Public diplomacy scholarship lacks a solid theoretical structure to direct 
research and practice. Most writings on public diplomacy focus on analyzing and 
evaluating strategies and practices, along with addressing shortcomings and making 
recommendations, without clear theoretical guidance (Satloff, 2004; Leonard, 2002; 
Snow& Taylor, 2009; Melissen, et al, 2005). Few researchers attempt to theorize and 
conceptualize public diplomacy (Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 2008). This study advances a 
theoretical framework designed to help find a connection between strategies followed 
by public diplomacy institutions and agenda-building function of those institutions. In 
other words, the effectiveness of the public diplomacy strategies followed by an 
advocate country determine its capacity to transfer the salience of issues and could 
deduce from its own agenda to the agenda of the media, public agenda, and eventually 
policy agenda in  a target country.  
In the following section, literature on agenda building and previous studies 
that offer evidence of the linkage between agenda-building and public diplomacy will 
be reviewed. 
Agenda building 
Unlike agenda setting that focuses on the transfer of issue salience from media 
to public (McCombs 1993), agenda building represents the reciprocal influence 
among policy makers, media and public (Lang& Lang 1983). Agenda building 
provides a theoretical framework to explain issue formation, transfer, and exchange 
processes among different social forces in a society. Beyond the agenda-setting effect 
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that explains media influence on public opinion, agenda building goes far to 
determine who sets media agenda, which reflect the distribution of power and values 
in the society (Gandy1982). The concept of agenda building is more sophisticated 
than agenda-setting hypothesis; as it explains several stages in which the salience of 
issues are formed and transferred. Cobb and Elder (1972) divided the agenda-building 
process into three steps: issue creation, issue expansion, and agenda entrance. Lang 
and Lang (1983) decided to study the Watergate crisis beyond agenda-setting effect to 
propose a six-step model of agenda building. The model is as follows: (1) the press, 
which highlights certain issues and brings those issues to the center of the scene; (2) 
the obtrusiveness of issues, which determines the amount of coverage each issue need 
to attract public's attention, meaning that the less direct experience the public receives 
with a given issue, the more extensive the coverage on that issue is need to attract the 
public's attention; (3) issues must be framed into certain meanings, which give the 
public certain understanding of those issues; (4) the language used by media influence 
public perception: each word has its own connotation, positive or negative; (5) issues 
must be symbolized: symbols work as cogitative bases that help people to decide 
which side they take or affiliate themselves with on a given issue or topic; Lastly, (6) 
agenda- building function works better  and the importance of an issue reaches its 
momentum when famous and credible individuals start to appear as supporters of the 
cause/claim.  
 Like agenda setting, agenda building has two levels (Denham 2010; Cheng 
2014). The first level of agenda building is about transfer of issue salience from one 
agenda to another. The second level focuses on the attributes of a given issue, which 
include two dimensions a substantive one and an affective one. The substantive 
dimension describes the aspect of a given issues that an agenda builder decides to 
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select and highlight. The affective dimension refers to the connotation of the selected 
aspects, whether it is positive, negative, or neutral.         
Denham (2010) identified three types of Agenda building studies: policy 
agenda building, media agenda building, and public agenda building. Undeniably, the 
term “agenda building” has emerged for the first time in a study of policy agenda, to 
describe groups’ efforts to transfer issues from their own agenda to those of policy 
makers (Cobb& Elder, 1971). However, what is unique about agenda-building studies 
is that the position of media content, policy makers, and public opinion has been 
altered across the literature as independent or dependent variables. For example, some 
studies positioned media content as an independent variable, as in the case of 
investigative reporting (Ettema& Glasser, 1998; Feldstien 2007), while others 
investigated influences on media content, as a dependent variable, as in the studies of 
information subsidies and government communications (Eshbaugh-Soha& Peak, 
2005; Curtin 1999; Cohen 1995; Kiousis, Kim, McDevitt& Ostrowski, 2009). In the 
term of media influence on policy agenda, Bennet (1980) described policy agendas as 
"the range of social values that receive legitimization through media coverage over 
the long period of time".  
On the other hand, media agenda building studies explain the ongoing 
negotiations between media personnel and their sources of information over media 
content (Berkowitz, 1994; Reich, 2006). Denham (2010) argued that news production 
is a subjective process that frequently influenced by sources that may have competing 
interests. In fact, news sources are just one of many factors influencing media 
contents. Other sources could include individual characteristics and beliefs of 
journalists, news organizations’ culture and constrains, journalistic routines, and 
professional values (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). However, this study focuses on the 
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influences outside news organizations, most specifically, the role of information 
providers in agenda building. This research aims to address the framework, in which 
an information provider is positioned as a media agenda builder or in certain cases as 
a direct public agenda builder through bypassing mass media.  
Some scholars view public agenda building studies, the third type of agenda 
building, as merely agenda setting research, which focus on transfer of issues salience 
from media agenda to public agenda (McCombs, 2004) however, public agenda 
building explains public behavioral response to any type of communicative strategies 
including interpersonal and mass communication (Denham, 2010). That may clarify 
why addressing public diplomacy strategies, which include a variety of 
communication types like monologues, dialogues, mass media and networking, within 
agenda building rather than agenda setting, is more effective and explanatory. 
Denham (2010) suggested that "hot-button" issues are formed through a combination 
of mass and interpersonal communication, which offer groups and issue entrepreneurs 
opportunities to act. Actually public attention has been viewed as a scarce resource, 
which always raises a question about "how mass audience become aware" in public 
agenda building literature (Hilgartner& Bosk, 1988; Stimson, 1991; Matthews, 2009; 
Lang&Lang,1983). In public agenda-building efforts, some scholars highlighted 
traditional strategies such as door-to-door canvassing, designated speakers in public 
settings (Howard, 2006), while others emphasized more advanced systematic 
approaches such as using internet technology, like distributing e-mails, and social 
networking sites (Williams& Trammell, 2005). 
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Public Diplomacy and International Agenda Building   
According to McClellan (2004), public diplomacy has been described as "The 
strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural, educational programming 
by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country 
that will enable the target country's political leaders to make decision that are 
supportive of advocate country's foreign policy objectives". This definition 
emphasizes the attempts of an advocate country to influence public opinion and 
foreign policy of a target country through a variety of informational, cultural and 
educational programs. Certainly, information and influence have been always the 
most prominent dynamics in public diplomacy literature. Kelley (2012) suggested, 
"Information provides audience with a set of issues to think about, while influence 
tells them how to think about those issues". This process involves the two levels of 
agenda building and extends them to the international context.  Similarly, Albritton 
and Manheim (2006) argued that the designation and manipulation of information 
settings can positively influence public opinion, which may turn into a political 
advantage. 
Recent studies on public diplomacy and international public relations have 
investigated the capacity of foreign countries to promote their agenda and cultivate 
favorable images in other countries through public relation campaigns and 
information subsidies (Zang& Camerion, 2003; Kiousis&Wu, 2008; Curtain&Gaither, 
2004). Agenda building has been utilized as a theoretical framework to study public 
diplomacy efforts of different counties in their attempt to influence foreign publics 
and to cultivate positive image as well as promote polices. For example, Kiousis and 
Wu (2008) explored the first- and second-level agenda building influence by 
investigating the effect of international public relations on United States’ news media 
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and American publics' perception of foreign nations. They used a triangle method by 
comparing Public Relation Counsel for foreign nations, media content in the New 
York Times, public opinion data. The researcher found that there was a weak 
correlation between public relation efforts and media coverage in the term of object 
salience and substantive attributes, and a noteworthy linkage between media coverage 
and salience of affective attributes. They concluded that public relations efforts of 
foreign nations decrease the negative media coverage of those nations, which decrease 
negative perceptions and attitude toward foreign nations. Kiousis and Wu (2008) 
emphasized the role of public relation counsel in establishing more favorable public 
opinion toward foreign nations. Similarly, Cheng (2014) tested the two levels of 
agenda building influence in the context of a mediated public diplomacy by 
comparing the news coverage of the President Xi Jinping from the Xinhua News 
Agency, the Chinese government-controlled news agency, and the elite US news 
outlets.  In a study on the competition over international agenda building, Sheafer and 
Gabay (2009) found that the cultural and political consistency between the advocate 
and the target country is a major determinant in the success of the first in promoting 
its agenda in the media of the second. In addition, targeted media and government 
play an active role in public diplomacy process. The researchers found that the 
capacity of the advocate government to initiate an agenda that is consistent with the 
media's values and the government's agenda in the target country not only increases 
its control over the agenda whose issues raised by the media, but also guarantees more 
access to the media with more opportunities to show its positions. According to 
Sheafer and Gabay (2009), public diplomacy is a very complicated process, in which 
different advocate countries (rival actors), targeted media and governments are 
competing to influence international agenda to their advantage. In turn, Curtin and 
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Gaither (2004) stressed the importance of culture considerations in international 
agenda building. In their study on international agenda building in cyberspace, the 
researchers addressed the inability of Arab government English-language websites to 
influence international publics as they failed to meet the needs and expectations of 
those audiences. Most news releases on such websites did not follow the Western 
media standards in their usage of articulating norms, news values and language 
(Curtin& Gaither, 2004). For example, the literal translation of Arabic information 
products generates run-on sentences full of adjectives, which is inconsistent with 
Western cultures that demands direct, clear, explicit information (Zaharna 1995). 
Based on the above evidences from previous studies, investigating public 
diplomacy strategies within agenda-building framework will help address the 
reciprocity and interdependency between a political actor on one side, and targeted 
media, audiences and government of a foreign nation on the other side. Public 
diplomacy process involves the three types of agenda building: information providers 
in an advocate country aiming to influence media agenda in a target country by taking 
advantage of agenda-setting function of mass media to influence public agenda, which 
in turn influences policy agenda to the advantage of the advocate country. However, 
this process is not that systematic, and its steps are replaceable. For example, 
information and communication technologies have recently allowed information 
providers to bypass media gatekeepers and engage directly with foreign publics 
(Curtin& Gaither, 2004).  
This study focuses on the role of public diplomacy institutions, which serve as 
information providers, in international agenda building. This process is defined as 
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strategic actions by those institutions that try to promote their government agenda in 
order to influence international public opinion and turn international policy to the 
advantage of their country.  Accordingly, each strategic action of public diplomacy 
must have an agenda-building function. The study advances such framework to 
explore and evaluate Egyptian public diplomacy strategies followed by the SIS and 
the Spokesman Office in the MFA.  
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Chapter Three 
Literature Review 
Public Diplomacy 
Public diplomacy is an interdisciplinary concept that falls at crossroads among 
several fields including international relation, media studies, public relation, and 
marketing (Gilboa, 2008).  It presents an innovative pattern for dynamic interactions 
among government, media, and public opinion (Soroka, 2003). Unlike traditional 
diplomacy that relies on government-to-government communications, public 
diplomacy has emerged as a mechanism to inform, engage, and influence foreign 
publics (Abou Zeid, 2011). Hocking (2004) indicates that traditional diplomacy is 
secret, inapproachable, and hierarchal, while public diplomacy is open, outreaching 
and non-hierarchal. In order to reach its target audiences, public diplomacy uses 
public platforms including international media, cultural centers, universities, and 
public relation firms, etc. According to Tuch (1990), public diplomacy is "a 
government's process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring 
about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as 
well as its national goals and policies".  In his article on the communications pyramid 
of public diplomacy, McClellan (2004) goes beyond this definition. He argued that 
the overarching goal of public diplomacy efforts is to convince the target country's 
policy makers and leaders to take the positions, and make the decisions that support 
the advocate of country's foreign policy objectives. According to him, public 
diplomacy is "the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural, 
educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion 
environment in a target country that will enable the target country's political leaders 
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to make decision that are supportive of advocate country's foreign policy 
objectives"(McClellan, 2004).Undeniably, he builds his definition of public 
diplomacy based on the premise that domestic public opinion in a country is a 
considerable determinant in foreign policy making process in this country, which 
represent a major dynamic in democracy. Therefore, the more democratic a target 
country is, the more productive the public diplomacy of an advocate country will be. 
McClellan also argues that, any public diplomacy strategy must be goal-oriented and 
policy-focused, with short-term and long-term objectives. Equally, Leonard (2002) 
proposes, "public diplomacy is not simply delivering message to an audience; it about 
getting a result". 
On the other hand, effective public diplomacy needs collective efforts of a 
whole society including the concerned state organizations, hand in hand with NGOs, 
private sector, mass media, even individual initiatives. The involvement of non-
governmental actors can give an edge of credibility, which government officials lack 
by nature of their job, to public diplomacy initiatives (Riordan, 2004). While people 
often tend to question government-affiliated information in general and information 
provided by foreign governments in particular, NGOs like Amnesty or Oxfam have a 
prestigious legacy for independence-therefore credibility- that can be efficiently 
utilized in transnational persuasion.    
Accordingly, one of the most workable definitions of "new public diplomacy" 
can be the collective efforts of a sending country including government and non-
government actors, through a well-established strategy with a concrete agenda, to 
create favorable public opinion in a receiving country, which will reflect positively in 
the government's positions and decisions in the receiving country, in way that support 
the sending country's foreign policy. Such collective efforts can be operationally 
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defined as transnational persuasive communication mechanisms to inform, engage 
and influence foreign publics including promoting news stories in international 
broadcasts, writing op-eds and making interview in local press of a receiving county, 
free publications, cultural events, trade fairs, exchange programs, listening tours, and 
language classes, undergraduate and graduate scholarships, and research grants, etc. 
On the other hand, foreign policy goals, in the context of public diplomacy, vary from 
convincing a country to sign a political agreement or trade arrangement, form a 
political or military alliance, participate in a peacekeeping mission, and vote for a 
United Nations resolution. This mechanism can be mobilized to establish good 
reputation, promote favorable images, and attract investors and tourists. In general, 
public diplomacy can be one of a country's tools to secure national interests, create a 
powerful voice in the global sphere, and eventually find an indispensable role in the 
regional and international system. 
In the following section, a review of the historical evolution of public 
diplomacy practice will be introduced, placing emphasis on the role of the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) in engineering American public diplomacy during 
the cold war, as well as the major developments that may influence public diplomacy 
practices and strategies in the post-Cold War world.  
Public Diplomacy and the Historical Role of the USIA 
Public diplomacy, in theory and practice, started to capture the attention of 
academic, diplomatic, and media circles during the Cold War period when the conflict 
between the US and the former Soviet Union dominated the international scene. The 
battle between the two superpowers was beyond the military and economic aspects. 
The ideological contest, democracy versus communism, was at highest level of 
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significance during that period. In such time, winning the hearts and minds of people 
around the world was a principle weapon in this so-called cognitive battle. Both 
countries utilized public diplomacy practices, primarily international broadcasting, to 
promote favorable image and create a positive attitude toward their ideologies and 
demeaning that of the rival ideology (Gilboa 2008; Rasmussen 2009). 
During the cold war, the role of the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
was crucial in promoting American values, and advocating U.S. policies around the 
globe. Under the Slogan "To Tell America's Story to the World", the USIA was 
established in 1953 by the Eisenhower administration. The main reason behind its 
establishment was to counter the Soviet propaganda and communicate American 
identity, culture and policies overseas within the portrayal of “superiority". Caterini 
(1973) identified the three major givens that led to the creation of the USIA: (1) the 
Smith-Mundt Act that was passed in 1948 to authorize overseas information programs 
and culture engagements, which portrayed the Communist ideology and the Soviet 
propaganda as an existential threat to the American nation; (2) The speech of 
President Truman "Campaign of Truth" in 1950, that addressed  the  U.S. need for 
more effective information operation; (3) The rising number of communist people in 
the U.S. government of that time created the urgency to establish a new body to stop 
such communist missionary and persuade American people that the US government 
was working for  better world. 
The United State Information Agency was the largest full-service public relation 
organization and propaganda apparatus in the world, with wide network of posts 
overseas and a two-billion annual budget (Snyder 1995).  According to Cull (2008), 
five key trajectories featured the USIA activities, initiatives and information programs 
across four decades of its Cold War career: 
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1) Advocacy: The advocacy function dominated the USIA works since its 
establishment. The main duty of the agency was to advocate American culture 
and values, and articulate the U.S. polices and values in understandable and 
persuasive denotations for foreign cultures. The USIA played a critical role in 
many advocacy campaigns promoted by the American government during the 
Cold War. The agency focused mainly on the theme of civil rights and the 
Vietnam War and worked hard to turn the Watergate scandal into a civics lesson 
for the world. It strongly promoted American message of human right during 
Cater era, and gained wide support for Afghan-fighters during the Soviet-Afghan 
war. Across its history, the USIA utilized diverse advocacy tactics including 
building libraries and information centers oversees, setting up exhibits around the 
world to portray the American lifestyle, producing anti-communist films, 
publishing magazines, and establishing TV networks that reached many countries 
across the globe.  
2) Listening: The importance of the USIA listening function changed across with 
the changing of U.S. administrations.  Some presidents, like Eisenhower, John F. 
Kennedy and Carter, considered the USIA evolution of international mode and 
public opinion polls and analysis as essential in order to incorporate its feedback 
into policy-making processes. On the contrary, other presidents, namely Johnson 
and Nixon, denied the significance of the USIA feedback and limited its role in 
forming the U.S foreign policy in which the directors of agency  lost their seat at 
the National Security Council. Generally speaking, although the USIA developed 
many internal mechanisms, such as the USIA's World Poll, the Office of 
Research and Intelligence, and the Soviet Propaganda Alert,  to listen to foreign 
audiences and measure their attitudes and perception on given issues, The U.S. 
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government conceived of the agency as approach to address the world rather than 
an instrument  to comprehend it. 
3) Cultural Diplomacy: It is true that the USIA never had full commitment to the 
cultural diplomacy, as the cultural component was not the focus inside the 
advocacy-driven agency. For some, the cultural engagement should have done for 
its own sake apart from propaganda and advocacy works. However, the USIA, in 
coordination with other agencies like the state department's cultural office, put 
some investment in cultural projection. The USIA strongly promote American 
studies to be a discipline in many schools and universities around the world. The 
agency engaged in many cultural activities including the operation of cultural 
canters overseas and the strategic translation of certain works in key target 
languages.  The USIA coordinated with the poplar cultural industry, particularly 
Hollywood to widen its reach circles abroad. However, the agency used to sell off 
its involvement in overseas cultural activities as an attempt to fill the gap left by 
commercial U.S. popular culture.   
4) Exchange Diplomacy: By virtue of its long-range impact, the exchanges have 
been identified as one of the most effective public diplomacy instruments. The 
USIA worked as a bridge among exchange organizations and partner universities 
in the U.S., on one side, and the target countries on the other side though it is 
overseas posts and offices. The agency staff in the field started to manage the 
exchange program under the 1961 Fulbright-Hey Act, which reinforced the 
educational exchange activities incorporating them within the U.S public 
diplomacy structure. However, the practice of exchanges during the cold war did 
not reflect the reciprocal nature of such programs that should have based on 
mutual learning and reciprocal communication. Instead, the exchange programs 
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were integrated into the Cold-War advocacy and propaganda apparatus. Its key 
target was to persuade foreign visitors and students with the superiority of the 
American way. The Foreign Leader Program, later known as the International 
Visitor Program, was one of the most successful exchanges of that era as it 
brought over 100,000 risings stars to America including nearly 200 presidents or 
heads of states.  
5) International Broadcasting: Although the USIA never had full control over the 
U.S. international broadcasting, particularly Voices of America (VOA), the 
relation between the USIA and the VOA was a tug of war, in which the 
broadcasting service was pushing for its independence and objectivity and the 
agency was insistent and pushing for more politicized content to serve advocacy 
purposes. However, during the Cold War, the VOA was viewed as "the U.S. 
ideological arms of anticommunism aiming to win allies while it attempted to 
undermine the Soviet Union and other communist nations" (Krugler, 2000). The 
element of propaganda was evident in the works of the international broadcasting 
service that was created to provide news and information about the American life 
and the U.S’s policies in more than forty language as the VAO's key target 
audiences were the USSR republics and Eastern Europe. On its side, the USIA 
tried to justify its struggle, to acquire more control over news and information 
disseminated by the VOA, as a practice of public diplomacy.  
The USIA was dissolved bythe1998 Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation 
Act and integrated its functions into the State Department. Nakamura (2010) suggests 
that the main motives behind this dissolution were the end of Cold War, and the need 
for enhancing the U.S. public diplomacy. Despite the USIA was widely viewed as a 
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tool for propaganda and a mere advocacy-driven agency, the agency has always 
represented an important stage in the development of public diplomacy across history.   
Public Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World 
Some scholars, including Fukuyama(2006), argued that the fall of the Berlin 
wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had led to the so-called “End of History", 
in which the US version of the truth including democracy, liberal economy, and 
American globalized culture became dominant, as the world has transformed from 
bipolarity to unipolarity, with the U.S. as the pol. However, the end of the Cold War 
does not mean the end of the ideological struggle among rival ideas. New global 
systems have emerged and generated its own political and communication dynamic. 
Zaharna (2007) determines three main developments, from a communication 
perspective, that may influence public diplomacy strategies in the post-Cold War 
world: 
First, the absence of the bipolar context has complicated the cross-nation 
communication environment, making transnational advocacy more challenging. 
During the Cold War, information dissemination and messaging production were the 
central components of public diplomacy; the one with more information and massage 
that is more persuasive could dominate and frame the political debate and effectively 
isolate and/or discredit the other. The communicative power of "us versus them "has 
lost its persuasive value in the new multi-polar context. 
Second, culture has become an integral part in the international relation 
dynamics. The rise of culture as means for defining national identity and framing 
political conflict has been illustrated by the Samuel Huntington's "Clash of 
Civilization" theory and other political and communication scholarship following the 
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end of Cold War. The interdependent relation between culture and communication 
shapes the production of massage by a political sponsor and the perception of that 
message by societies. Cultural assumptions and prejudices serve as invisible frames 
that influence how political entities design messaging content and style, and how 
populaces interpret them. Accordingly, information production and dissemination 
have become more challenging as messaging has become more vulnerable to cultural 
distortions, misinterpretations, and misapprehensions. 
  Third, the emergence of new Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT) has a vast impact on communication dynamics in the international political 
arena. While the emergence of printing technologies is accompanied by the rise of the 
nation-state, the new technologies of digital media and electronic communication 
create a new world order in which non-state actors, including business corporations, 
NGOs, interest groups, and prominent individuals, emerge as new communication 
players taking part in the global battle over hearts and minds of the international 
audience, along with traditional states. Moreover, the interactivity and connectivity of 
new media have blurred the barriers between message producers and recipients 
creating a new communication dynamic in which the focus has shifted from message 
content to massage exchange. Several developments have merged the rise of new 
media, such as non-territorial communities, virtual worlds, multiple identities, and 
nonexclusive jurisdictions, which may alter the rule of the games in international 
relations, and definitely influence public diplomacy strategies and transnational 
advocacy mechanisms in such globalized world (Deibert, 1997).  
In such a globalized system, the practice of public diplomacy is not a matter of 
luxury, but it is a necessity for survival. Each state should locate its technique to 
secure national interests and gain political influence for better functioning in such a 
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highly competitive environment over international agenda building. In a study about 
why states practice public diplomacy, Rasmussen (2009) concludes that public 
diplomacy is no longer exclusive practices of western countries and great powers.  
Various models and patterns of public diplomacy have been utilized by different 
countries, regardless the number of embassies a state have abroad, the numbers of 
years a state have acquired a full membership in the UN and other international 
organizations, even the degree of the democratic consolidation in a state. Norway 
provides a vivid example. It has a population of only five million people, speaking a 
dead language, lacks strategic location or globalized culture, is not a hub for 
international organization or transnational corporations, and is not a member of 
European Union. Nevertheless,  it has successfully acquired a prestigious status in the 
international community by branding itself as a peace broker, in spite of limitations 
due to its size, population, and resources (Leonard, 2002).The country has engaged in 
many peace activities including conflict mediation in Middle East, Colombia, and Sri 
Lanka, financial aids, frequent participation in peace-keeping missions, and funding 
post-conflict activities, such as sponsoring International Cairo Conference on 
Reconstruction Gaza hosted by Egypt in October 2014.  Norway shows how a small 
country can utilize its diplomatic leverage to enhance its role and appearance in the 
global sphere. 
In the following section, a review of the relation between public diplomacy and soft 
power will be introduced by providing different perspectives on the linkage between 
the two concepts. 
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Public Diplomacy and Soft Power  
      The relationship between public diplomacy and soft power has developed as a 
rising  dynamic in international politics to set the global agenda and frame the public 
debate in the international community. From Joseph Nye's perspective, public 
diplomacy is a government communication instrument to attract and influence foreign 
publics through effective utilization of soft power resources (Nye, 2008). In other 
words, the goal of public diplomacy is to mobilize those  potential  resources through 
various strategies including broadcasting, prompting cultural products, setting 
exchange programs, and so forth. Nye (2004) has categorized soft power resources 
into three main assets: attractive culture, credible political values and legitimate 
foreign policies. According to him, the communicative capacities of public diplomacy 
strategies rely on the attractiveness and persuasive values of these resources. without 
soft power resources, public diplomacy efforts become useless, and even 
counterproductive.  
      Soft power has been defined as power of attraction whose ability to seduce rather 
than coerce can help a country to get preferred outcomes in world politics. If a 
country is viewed globally as an iconic model with attractive culture, values and 
policies that are legitimate and moral, other countries may follow its policies, patterns 
and structures due to admiration rather than fear. Through shaping preference of 
others,  countries can felicitate  their interests in International arena and turn any 
global policies to their political advantage (Nye, 2008).  However,  some scholars 
question the softness of that power of attraction. For example, Ferguson (2003) 
discredits the soft aspects in the spread of goods and ideas in which attraction 
simultaneously overlaps with other negative feelings like jealousy, animosity and 
resistance. According he clearly addresses the "diplomatic power" and " moral 
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appeals" as significant forms of power in world politics, away from their sources of 
attractiveness and softness (Ferguson, 2003). In fact, the utilization of American soft 
power and its related public diplomacy practices can provide a vivid example, in 
which their outcome has been a combination of contradicting attitudes including 
fascination, hatred and resistance toward the United States, particularly in the Arab 
and Muslim world (Zaharna, 2007). 
      Indeed, the new communication dynamics and recent realities of information 
technologies have developed a new paradigm for the relation between soft power and 
public diplomacy. Unlike Joseph Nye's model of wielding soft power resources in 
public diplomacy efforts, a new paradigm has been emerged to create rather than 
wield soft power through public diplomacy initiatives and programs. By employing 
the new communication dynamics that are based on message exchange rather than 
message dissemination, a political sponsor can get a desired outcome through creation 
of soft power during the process of communication itself, which can eliminate any 
intervening variables that may hinder the preplanned public diplomacy efforts utilized 
already-existed soft power resources (Zaharna, 2007). In recent years, several non-
government organizations (NGOs) have followed this model in their search for power 
to set political agendas and frame global debates toward many issues such as global 
warming and landmines. In contrast to the US public diplomacy efforts that wield its 
soft power, NGOs gain power through various activities of networking and relation-
building efforts. From Rhonda Zaharna's perspective, creating soft power is more 
strategic and compatible with Today's age of new information and communication 
technologies as it blurs the barriers between source and audience and turns a culture 
difference into a positive force rather than being challenge and potential source of 
hatred in  wielding-soft power communication patterns.                 
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In the following section, a review of  various public diplomacy strategies will be 
introduced in attempt to explore how political entities utilize different approaches, to 
communicate with the international community.  
 Public Diplomacy Strategies 
i. Information and relational communication frameworks  
There are two main communication frameworks in which public diplomacy 
strategies and initiatives can be categorized and analyzed: the information framework 
and the relational framework (Zaharna, 2009). While massaging design and 
dissemination is the major mechanism to promote policy goals in the information 
framework, the relational framework shifts the focus from messaging as a product to a 
communication as a process in order to build relationships and create international 
consensus over issues of common concern. Actually, the overarching goals of public 
diplomacy initiatives within the two frameworks are quite different. In information 
initiatives, massages is designed and disseminated in an effort to advocate policies, 
promote political interest and craft positive images to achieve the goals of a single 
political entity.  Unlike the informational approach, public diplomacy efforts within 
relational framework essentially aims to promote and maintain smooth international 
relations, which may contribute to a better international milieu (Melissen, 2005). 
For further explanation, the main questions in the informational approach are 
what is the message? And what are the best communication channels to send it out? 
American public diplomacy provides a vivid example of this approach as many 
significant reports on U.S. public diplomacy emphasized the importance of efficient 
messaging strategies (Zaharna, 2009). Control over the message is one of the 
dominant features of such approach. For instance, the White House’s office of 
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strategic communication releases talking point on a daily basis in attempt to control 
its massage. The U.S. State Department circulates similar conversation points to its 
overseas offices. However, the extreme form of control over information 
dissemination and design may turn public diplomacy efforts into mere propaganda, 
which represent the oldest and most famous model of information initiative (Ellul, 
1956; Cull, Culbert& Welch, 2003). The difference between new public diplomacy 
efforts and old propagandistic approaches will be further discussed later in this 
section. 
 On the other hand, information initiatives mostly have a closed-container 
design that often restricts or limits interaction between the political sponsor and 
publics. The one-way communication approach is dominant in information initiatives, 
in which audience play a passive or limited role. Some initiatives may provide 
channels for audience to give their feedback. However, the usage of that feedback is 
still optional, and beyond the central dynamic of the process. Indeed public diplomacy 
initiatives within the informational framework use a variety of communication 
channels to convey their messages, including "interpersonal (designated speaker), 
print (flyers, brochures, fact sheets), audio/visual (films, videos), print and broadcast 
mass media (newspapers, radio and television), and electronic media (websites, 
emails)" (Zaharna, 2009). Although the interactivity and connectivity of today's 
globalized world is not reflected strongly in such information initiatives, the 
informational approach in public diplomacy is still a strategic imperative— provided 
that credibility is a must. Credibility has become a major determinant of the 
persuasive value of any information initiative nowadays, given the new 
communication dynamics in which political sponsors must compete for message 
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delivery and acceptance in today's highly competitive information environment 
(Zaharna, 2009).  
Unlike information initiatives, relational initiatives rely on relation-building 
strategies rather than messaging strategies, which reflect the principles of reciprocity 
and mutuality (Leonard 2005; Rose &Smith 2004). Zaharna (2009) argues the major 
dynamic in relational initiatives is coordination rather than control, in which 
audiences play an active role as participants or stakeholders. Other scholars stress the 
persuasive value of different type of control in relationship-based programs calling 
"control mutuality", in which the effectiveness of the programs depends on audience 
share in deciding and controlling elements of the programs in all phases: defining, 
designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating (Grunig& Hon, 1999). In his 
comparative study on network communication and mass communication in public 
diplomacy, Zaharna (2007) proposes that the network communication approach that 
focuses on information exchange and relationship building, is more effective than 
mass media that focus on information production and dissemination in cross-culture 
communications. Despite its capacity to provide mass audience with largest amount of 
information, most probably in uniform messages, in the least amount of time, mass 
media remain vulnerable in cross-culture settings as its content is often culture-bound, 
and subject to misunderstanding and distortion by foreign publics (Zaharana 2007). 
Similarly, Hachten and Scotton  (2002) argue that " more and faster news 
communication across national borders does not automatically lead to better 
understanding ; often, it results in enmity and distrust, because the profound cultural 
and social difference that characterize the world community preclude agreement on 
what is legitimate news”. For example, a congregation of media scholars and U.S. 
policy experts have questioned the effectiveness of the U.S’s international 
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broadcasting that target Arab audiences following 9/11 events, due to cultural and 
psychological barriers (Youmans, 2009; Douai, 2014; Dabbous& Nasser, 2009) . 
Comparing to Arabs-sponsored channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia, Al-Hurra's 
viewership, credibility, and trustworthiness remained limited, as the U.S. Arabic-
speaking channel had been widely viewed among Arab audiences as a merely U.S.-
agenda proprietor and a model of American cultural imperialism (Dabbous& Nasser, 
2009). Its success as an effective tool for public diplomacy remains questionable. In 
contrast, culture is an asset rather than a challenge in transnational networks and holds 
that relation-building activities and message exchange practices are able to blur the 
distinction between source and audience. The International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL) provides an illustrative example of how great the influence of the 
network communication approach can be. The ICBL was formed in 1991 by six 
outstanding NGOs, and by 1996 more than 1000 NGOs from 60 countries had 
engaged in the campaign as participants, as well as a group of "like- minded" small 
and medium-size states headed by Canada's foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy was 
formed to support the campaign (Davis 2004). The ban on landmines has turned from 
a mere humanitarian call by a few NGOs in 1991 into an international treaty signed 
by 123 countries in 1996, and even transformed into international law in 1999, which 
set the codification for landmines how to regulate their presence and how to recycle 
them. Moreover in 1997, the ICDL was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, due to its 
efforts to end the harmful consequences that could befall civilians would they be in a 
territory that with holds landmines. The ICBL was a model of network-based public 
diplomacy and partnership between nation states and NGOs to co-built credibility, 
identity, and promote shared values and narratives.  
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ii. Monologue, dialogue and collaboration in public diplomacy 
Communication scholars frequently present the three communication patterns 
(monologue, dialogue, and collaboration) in an opposite context. Some argued that 
new public diplomacy should rely on dialogues that are more effective and influential 
than one-way communications (Riordan, 2004). However, the usage of the three 
communication patterns is an essential component of effective public diplomacy 
(Cowan& Arsenault, 2008). Each has its own edge. The tricky question would always 
be: which way of communication in what time under what circumstances. According 
to Landtsheer and Feldman (2000), since the time of Aristotle, no one can deny the 
capacity of speech to move citizens and countries toward peace, war, and 
reconciliation. The impact of memorable quotes of Abraham Lincoln, J.F Kennedy, 
Winston Churchill, De Gaulle, Jamal Abdel Nasser, and other great leaders, have been 
always preceded their time, geographical and even linguistic barriers. In critical times, 
monologues including speeches, statements, proclamations, editorials, and press 
releases can be the optimal way to mobilize the targeted audience behind certain 
cause, or to strongly react to an urgent situation.  
On the other hand, dialogic communication is an indispensable tool of 
effective public diplomacy. Dialogue does not necessarily change foreign policy 
positions, or alters opinions towards foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, a capacity 
to listen, to provide an opportunity for others to address their concerns, and to show 
respect for those opposing viewpoints may undermine conflicts, and increase mutual 
understanding. The power of addressing human desire to be heard can be successfully 
used in bridging differences and form relationships among communicators. "Dialogue 
of Cultures" provides a very good example of how Deutsche Welle, the Germany 
international broadcasting agent, could be able to reach people in the Arab world. 
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This popular program is considered an open platform to discuss various topics by 
distinguished intellectuals from Germany and the Arab world. In their study, 
Lucassan and Zollner (2004) observe that the followers of the program were very 
satisfied with its content and agenda, and appreciated Deutsche Welle's attempts to 
establish friendly relationships with Arab people. Moreover, the emergence of call-in 
talk shows in the 1990s gives another example of the influence of such open-container 
programs on receivers. For instance in 1994, Voice of America began to broadcast 
call-in shows in many different languages. In general, reciprocal communications help 
policy makers in a sending country to articulate their policies in simpler, 
understandable terms for foreign public in a receiving country without the usage of 
jargons (Cowan& Arsenault, 2008). 
        Collaboration is another effective way to engage foreign publics. In the term of 
public diplomacy, collaboration refers to cooperative works and initiatives, in which 
participants from different countries take part in a joint project in order to solve a 
common problem, defuse a conflict, promote shared values, and/or advocate a certain 
vision toward an international matter (Cowan& Arsenault, 2008). It takes various 
forms including short-term projects such as a friendly  football match, writing a piece 
of music and participating in a play; medium development projects like upgrading 
slums and food security programs; and long-term projects like participating in post-
conflict reconstruction efforts and anti-global warming activities. The communicative 
power of common goals and shared experiences may provide a solid ground for 
building trust and maintaining long lasting relationships among participants (Ryan, 
2007). Similarly, Sherif (1958) argued that cooperative projects play a vital role in 
facilitating reconciliation.  
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iii. Public diplomacy beyond propaganda 
Some scholars refer to public diplomacy as state propaganda (Rasmussen, 
2009). It is true that both use persuasive strategies to influence target audiences, 
including some aspects of advertising, branding, political campaigning and public 
relation. However, there is a clear distinction between public diplomacy and 
propaganda. Propaganda seeks to template the minds of multitudes through 
manipulative representation of issues and events, while public diplomacy aspires to 
broaden the horizons of people through information, education, and engagement 
(Melissen, 2005). Public diplomacy should work as an eye-opener for foreigners, with 
an attempt to increase their knowledge about a country's policies and positions, and 
decrease their prejudices towards its values and cultural norms. Credibility and trust-
building measures is a necessity in new public diplomacy strategies. Actually, in the 
age of globalized communication and information technology, any propagandistic 
approach to public diplomacy can be counterproductive. For instance, the outdated 
propagandistic mechanisms of Egyptian mainstream media in the aftermath of the 30th 
June revolt was one of the main reasons behind its failure in influencing  international 
public opinion, especially in the first weeks following the uprising. The fluttering 
flags at the top of television, and the claims of U.S.-Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy, 
along with labeling the post-30th of June scene as a “war on terror” would never help 
in getting the Egyptian massage heard among foreign public (Shukrallah,2013).The 
absence of balanced, honest Egyptian narrative unintentionally increased the 
persuasive power of its non-contextual, second-hand Western counterpart.    
Indeed, public diplomacy, by its unique nature of being persuasive and honest 
at the same time, can fill the gap between propaganda and truth. To explain, there is 
an infamous old Egyptian Proverb stating that "a concrete lie is better than an abstract 
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fact", which actually refers to the pillar of propaganda that Laswell (1937) classically 
defined as "a way to speak more concretely but less accurately" (Severin& Tankard, 
2010).  Nevertheless, effective public diplomacy can bridge such contradiction by 
promoting a better version of concrete, reliable, and persuasive truths. Similarly, 
Edward Marrow, one of the prominent pioneers of public diplomacy, wrote in 1963 
"Truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst: to be persuasive we must be 
believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It 
is as simple as that" (Rasmussen, 2009). 
iv. Reactive and proactive approaches in public diplomacy  
It is true that daily communications and news management lie in the heart of 
public diplomacy practices. The rapid response to what happens in one's country and 
the rest of the world is a pressing need, in order to provide the right context of 
domestic events and clarify the government's decisions about them, as well as explain 
the country's positions on global updates to foreign publics. However, such reactive 
approach is not sufficient to achieve the ultimate goals of public diplomacy, which are 
"increasing people's familiarity with one's country, increasing people's apperceptions 
of one's country, engaging people with one's country, and eventually influencing 
people to back positions of one's country" (Leonard, 2002).  For example, in the late 
2001, Al Jazeera started to broadcast Osama bin Laden videotapes. In the very 
beginning of this phenomenon, US officials wanted to prevent both Al Jazeera and 
American networks form airing more messages from bin Laden. In the new era of 
diplomacy and information technologies, such actions are considered frustrating, and 
against the culture of openness and freedom of expression, that America tries to 
signify and publicize (Nye, 2008). The healthier solution would be to create content, 
promote an initiative, and design a campaigns that are able to counter Bin Laden 
 37 
narratives. This is the second stage of public diplomacy, which depends on more 
proactive strategies. Instead of just responding to what is happening, these strategies 
focus on setting the news agenda through organizing events, promoting initiatives, 
and planning advertising and political campaigns (Leonard, 2002). Indeed, the main 
advantage of the proactive approach is providing the communicator with more space 
to put more planning and consideration into the message they send out or the image 
they promote. In other words, the proactive communication strategy, by its nature, 
helps the communicator to use more customized designs, which increase the 
transformative capacity of the message to influence the target audience. 
v. Transnational messaging and the role of cultural and political barriers  
Designing an international persuasive message in today's highly mediatized 
world is one of the biggest challenges facing public diplomacy actors. This can be 
illustrated very well with the following quote of Colin Powell about his time in the 
Gulf War when he told his staff: "Remember, when we are out there on television, 
communicating instantaneously around the world, we’re talking to five audiences.’ 
One, the reporters who ask the question – important audience. Second audience, the 
American people who are watching. The third audience, 170 capitals who may have 
an interest in what the subject is. Fourth, you are talking to your enemy, and it was a 
unique situation to know that your enemy was getting the clearest indication of your 
intentions by watching you on television at the same time you were giving that 
message. Fifth, you were talking to the troops. Their lives were on the line."(Leonard, 
2002)  
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  Many variables determine the persuasive power of the transnational message, 
among them : (1) political and cultural barriers; (2) the identity of communicators; (3) 
the format of public diplomacy massages. 
1. Political and cultural barriers  
 According to Nye (2008), one of the main purposes behind 
miscommunication among different nations is the underestimation of the influence of 
cultural dissimilarities and prejudices. Political leaders think the problem is that the 
others lack information, and once they know what we know, they will simply think 
the same like us, which is not the case in many situations. In fact, all information goes 
through cultural filters. Prior experiences, presumptions, historical images, and the 
background of national reputation, inter alia, of many cultural biases that certain 
foreign audience may have toward a country greatly affect how this audience 
processes any information about this country.  This is one of the main differences 
between traditional diplomacy and its public counterpart. In the first one, the role of 
historical narratives and cultural biases is relatively limited, because the 
communication with policy makers is more deliberative and interests-based. Hayden 
(2007) argues that the demands of persuasion are different for policy-makers than 
publics. Each audience both expects and uses different kinds of arguments. 
Accordingly, messages should be carefully designed, in which they explain the 
sending country's policies and positions within a harmonic context that meets 
audience's needs, expectations, and ambitions in the receiving country (McClellan, 
2004). 
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2. The identity of communicators 
 On the other hand, the identity of communicator is one of the major 
determinants of how persuasive the message will be. When it comes to public 
diplomacy, it is not just a matter of massage content, it is also about who tells the 
message. Foreign publics, by their nature, are suspicious of what others may say. 
Therefore, one of the effective ways to maximize the influence of a public diplomacy 
messages is to let one of the locals convey the message. The audience tend to believe 
more in one of their own than in foreign government representatives, especially those 
who are coming from rival governments (Hoffman, 2002).For example, as a part of its 
public diplomacy efforts to improve its image in the United States after 9/11 attacks, 
Saudi Arabia’s announcement of its 2002 peace initiative came through Thomas 
Friedman, the outstanding New York Times columnist and Pulitzer Prize winning 
author (Burnham, 2013). The Saudi initiative proposed normalization of relations 
between Israel and the Arab world in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from the 
occupied territories. Friedman published an op-ed on February 6th, 2002 in which he 
suggested "land for peace" principle, as a way out of the conflict in the Middle East. 
Two weeks later, Friedman published another op-ed about his visit to Saudi Arabia in 
which he was summoned to meet the Crown Prince Abdulla to discuss his initiative. 
The Prince told Friedman that he almost read his thoughts, literally "Have you broken 
into my office", and talked about his identical initiative that he was planning to 
announce at the Arab League Summit, held in Beirut at the end of March. Burnham 
(2013) argues that the timing of Friedman's proposal and his subsequent meeting with 
the prince is too much convenient to be coincidental. The kingdom relied on 
Friedman's legendary ability to sell ideas, in its attempt to presents itself to America 
as a peace-making country that is open for communications rather than the distorted 
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"a breeding ground of extremism and an incubator for terrorists" images that had been 
prevalent in the United Sates after 9/11 attacks.  
  Relying on local Public Relation firms is another way to increase the 
persuasive power of PD messages. These firms tend to function better in a given 
political and cultural context. They usually utilize scientific knowledge based on 
public opinion polls to reach favorable results, in a way that help address the 
weaknesses in the agenda of a sending country, which may clash with public opinion 
in a receiving country. Dealing with such weaknesses, especially in the early phases 
of any campaign, may increase the persuasive capacity of messages and achieve 
desirable goals (Gilboa, 2008). However, any dependence on local PR firms should 
come within larger consistent and well-established strategy for public diplomacy and 
national image building rather than randomly frequent public relations campaigns that 
deals with issues and situations based on case-by-case tactics.  
3. The format of public diplomacy massages 
The content and format of PD messages play a vital role in international 
communication. Strong and well-established arguments may increase the persuasive 
power of any transnational message. One of the most debatable questions in 
communication literature is "Which is the better strategy—to present only the 
arguments that support your position or to present the both sides of arguments but 
stress on the ones that support your position" (Severin& Tankard, 2010).  However, 
within the context of public diplomacy communications, this issue is almost settled 
down for many reasons. To explain, a host of communication scholars (Hovlandand 
Sheffield, et al) argue that the more educated the audience is, the more effective the 
two-sided message will be; and vice versa (Severin& Tankard, 2010).On the other 
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hand, McClellan (2004) suggests that the target audience, in any attempt to create 
friendly public opinion environment in another country, should be the current and 
next generations of opinion leaders in this country. This audience mainly composes of 
student, professors, intellectuals, artists and journalists. Accordingly, the two-sided 
message is more effective, in order to influence such well-educated audience. 
Furthermore, presenting the both sides of a story is a essential requirement in today's 
globalized world in which different Television satellites and internet platforms with 
different agendas are widely spread blurring hypothetical geographical boundaries. In 
fact, exposure to the two-sided message helps people to be more resistant to the 
opposing side's later persuasive efforts, and less vulnerable to their counter arguments 
(Severin& Tankard, 2010).  
vi. Coherence between public diplomacy and policy  
Since public diplomacy refers to a kind of dynamic interaction among 
government, media, and public opinion, effective government policy is considered a 
precondition for successful public diplomacy. Indeed, public diplomacy is not a 
façade for ineffective wrong-headed policy (Seib, 2009). For example, the continuous 
Bush administration initiatives on providing medical assistance to combat AIDS in 
Africa and supporting development programs in other developing countries did not 
really count as long as civilians were frequently killed under the fire of the US troops 
during the second Iraq war. Such initiatives did not help save the reputation of 
America, or halt the decline of the U.S. standing in public opinion polls in many part 
of the world. Public diplomacy planning should go hand in hand with policy 
constructing. No matter how smart the communication strategy is if it transfers 
contradictory or confusing message (Nye, 2008). In such period of information 
technology and globalized communication, concealing information from the public is 
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almost an impossible mission. People will distinguish it, and will realize it faster than 
ever before (Seib, 2009). However, the new media realities of wide accessibility and 
global proliferation can give an edge for public diplomacy actors as long as they 
utilize more transparent, creative and fastest communication techniques to reach 
foreign populaces. This never ensues without substantive policy initiatives and 
coherent policy decisions to support public diplomacy efforts.  
 
The Middle East and Public Diplomacy  
Over the years, the Middle East has been target environment for the U.S. and 
other Western countries aiming to conduct public diplomacy in such a geopolitically 
and socio-economically strategic part of the world. How to device a successful public 
diplomacy campaign toward the Middle East has been a major concern for public 
diplomacy scholars and practitioners through different times and situations across 
history (Satloff, 2004; Douglas& Neal, 2013). There has been enormous number of 
books, articles, and reports published in the Western world about the effective ways to 
communicate with Arab and Muslim people in the region. In the United States, large 
amount of finical and human resources have been devoted to win the battle over the 
minds and hearts of Arab People. In fact, most Middle Eastern countries are often in 
the receiving end of public diplomacy (Ndoye, 2009). In his book "soft power: The 
means to success in world politics", Joseph Nye discussed the Middle East as a 
singular case that represents a particular challenge for American soft power and 
public diplomacy without any reference for soft power relevancy and public 
diplomacy applicability in the region in general. For him, the Middle East was just the 
target environment that he tried to understand to guarantee full effectiveness of the 
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U.S. polices in the region (Nye, 2004). Copeland (2009) went beyond that, to 
highlight the ethnocentric nature of public diplomacy since it has been defined, 
developed and practiced exclusively by individuals, private firms and government 
organizations in developed countries. Even for some Arab scholars and journalists, 
any utilization of soft power through public diplomacy practices has been merely seen 
as an integral part of the U.S. imperial project to dominate the Middle East, spread 
American values, and protect its interest in the region (Mouawad, 2013).  
In their efforts to promote a good image abroad, most countries in the Middle East 
engage in international public relation campaigns rather than public diplomacy 
activities (Ndoye, 2009; Al-Yasine&Dasht, 2008; Albritton&Manheim, 1984).To 
convey a certain image to the rest of the world, the majority of Arab countries tend to 
rely on foreign firms rather than public diplomacy structures of their own (Al-
Yasine& Dasht, 2008). The disparate efforts of Saudi Arabia to improve its image in 
the United States right after the 9/11 attacks provides a vivid example of Arab 
dependence on PR foreign firms. Few days after the terrorist attacks, Saudi 
government started to randomly hire the biggest PR agencies and communication 
firms in America one after another, such as Burson-Marsteller, Qorvis 
Communications, and Creative Cable Television. Each firm did its part of the 
promotional works separately, including organizing visits of Saudi senior officials to 
the United States, the issuance of many invitations for American journalists to visit 
the kingdom, airing TV commercials, and so on. According to Burnham (2013) , the 
anti-Saudi narrative that was based on the fact that the fifteen of the nineteen 
hijackers, and Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the attacks, were of Saudi 
Arabian origins trumped the Saudi shallow PR message that was built on the historic 
narrative of the Saudi-U.S. friendship, and anti-terrorism rhetoric. The Saudi PR 
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campaign lacked a concrete agenda. Moreover, the absence of strong lines of 
argumentation undermined its influence on American public (Burnham, 2013). Anhlot 
(2009) argued, "There is no proof yet that mere messaging has any influence 
whatsoever on people's pre-existing ideas and prejudices about other countries." 
However, the inexperienced government officials in developing counties can be easily 
tricked, by sales agents for global public relation, communications, or media sales 
firms, into spending thousands or even millions of dollar on impractical propaganda.   
In fact, the majority of Arab countries lack the practice of efficient public diplomacy 
that has well-defined agenda with strategic goals, though well-structured institutions 
and channels exist and are at their disposal. In a study to explore public diplomacy 
strategies at the Arab embassies in the United States, Khakimova's (2013) discoveries 
were as follows: (1) Arab public diplomacy efforts focus mainly on contacting the 
U.S. media and building personal relationships with American journalists; (2) Arab 
embassies tend to target U.S. decision makers rather than American public in their 
communication;(3) one-way communication approach has characterized the 
embassies' utilization of new media;(4) unlike new public diplomacy that provide a 
capacity to listen as much as to speak, the embassies seek to influence through 
unidirectional flow of information rather than engage in dialogic communications;(5) 
Culture difference undermine public diplomacy efforts as the majority of 
communication officers at the Arab embassies tend to work as cultural enclaves 
subject to little acculturation rather than cultural interpreters who facilitate better 
understanding between their government and the American public. 
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Public Diplomacy and Arab Spring  
The pro-democracy movements and popular uprisings that have swept the 
region since 2011have raised questions about Arabs' capacity to peacefully tell their 
story to the rest of the world. For many years, the absence of an attractive Arab 
narrative has been one of the main explanations behind the misleading appearance of 
Arabs in Western academia and journalistic writings. For example, in his book 
"Democracy without Democrats: The renewal politics in the Muslim World", John 
Waterbury argued that the regional culture, intolerant religious beliefs and practices of 
Arab people will hinder any efforts to promote democracy and political liberalization 
in the region. From Waterbury's perspective, the democratization efforts in the Middle 
East must overcome rather than utilize the basic elements of Arab and Muslim culture 
(Waterbury, 1994). Nonetheless, the soft nature of the Arab revolts introduced the 
increasing possibilities and new potentials for developing effective public diplomacy 
channels through the utilization of Arab soft power. The nonviolent nature of the Arab 
uprisings, particularly the initial revolutionary waves, refuted the mainstream notion 
that Arabs are aggressive by nature and have tendencies toward violence (Batstone, 
2014). The Arab spring is associated with the story of "Arab freedom fighters who 
gathered in mass peaceful protests to struggle against autocracies and repressive 
regimes" can greatly influence foreign societies across the globe. The attractiveness 
and communicative power of such narrative can be utilized to generate a story of 
Arabs that is worth to be told to the whole world, which is considered the starting 
point in building up an effective public diplomacy strategy. During the Cold War, the 
mission statement of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the main structure that 
was responsible for conducting American public diplomacy, was "telling America's 
story to the world".  Similarly, once Arabs articulate their story that is worth telling to 
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the whole world, they will soon find their competitive edge in the global battle over 
winning the hearts and minds of  international publics. 
 
Egypt and Public Diplomacy 
Since the January, 25th revolution, there has been a growing debate on the 
decline of Egyptian soft power over the last years and the prospects of reviving the 
Egyptian status in the region through public diplomacy activities. Several Egyptian 
scholars addressed that revaluation as a golden opportunity for the country to emerge 
as an iconic model of peaceful revolution and democratic transition (Abutalib, 2011; 
Hanafi, 2012; Al-Zayatti, 2011). Ali Mauawad (2013) suggested that the 
revolutionary states have potentials to promote soft power and utilize public 
diplomacy efforts in their foreign relations. That can be reflected in the Egyptian 
public diplomacy delegations and special envoys who visited countries like Iran, 
Sudan and Ethiopia aiming at deescalating tension and normalizing mutual relations 
in the wake of the January 25th revolution. However, the majority of the post-
revolution public diplomacy efforts derived from personal initiatives without strategic 
messaging to promote during those visits. The lack of institutionalism and strategic 
planning was evident in those initiatives (Mauwad, 2013; Hanafi, 2012). It is true that 
there have been wide expectations that the post-revolution Egypt could regain the 
prestigious status of the country during Nasser era. However, unlike the 1952 
revolution, the Arab-spring uprisings in Egypt failed to develop an attractive narrative 
to capture the imagination of publics across the region.     
Back to history, one of the main reasons behind the legacy of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser and the high profile of Egypt in 1950s and 1960s is the set of strategic 
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messages promoted across the region and the world during his rule. The Egyptian 
narrative to the outside world was strategically planned and widely disseminated to 
serve the nation's interests and objectives The Nasser regime was able to promote and 
maintain what widely known as Nasserism's ideologies in which Pan-Arabism, anti-
colonial sentiments and nationalist values were reinforced through systematic use of 
broadcasting, music and rhetoric (Podeh &Winkler, 2004; Frishkopf, 2010). For 
example, The Voice of Arab, a radio broadcasting network, was created by Nasser 
himself to work as propaganda apparatus to spread the state values and ideologies in 
the Egyptian society and across the region. The voice of the Arabs played a prominent 
role in unifying Arab listeners around a set of values and ideas derived from the 
Nasser-inspired Pan -Arabism ideology. The Radio broadcasted newly forms of 
nationalist music and advocacy programs promoted to feed anti-colonial sentiments 
and fuel the atmosphere of nationalism across the Arab region (Diong, 2015; Boyd, 
1975 ). Frishkopf (2010) stated that “Cairo was the entertainment capital of the 
Arabic-speaking Middle East, producing  ... a l-musiqua al-arabia and ultimately set 
the standard by which any newly composed Arab music was to be gauged". Indeed, 
the state cleverly employed diverse forms of Egyptian soft power including radio 
programming, music and movies to portray Nasser as a leader for all Arabs, not just 
for the Egyptians.          
Unlike Nasser era,  Egypt, under Mubarak's rule, looked like any other states 
in the region with no real leverage or leadership potentials since it had shown 
inefficiency and even incapacity in dealing with several regional issues and 
challenges such as the occupation of Iraq in  2003, South Sudan separation in 2010,  
Nile basin crisis, Israel's war on Lebanon in 2006, and its continuous attacks on Gaza, 
internal Palestinian split, the increasing power of Iran in the Gulf area, and that of 
 48 
Ethiopia in African Horn, as well as the growing role of Turkey in the Middle East 
and that of South Africa in the “black continent. As Amr Hamzawy (2010) stated, "in 
the domestic, regional, and global minds, it has become clear that Egypt’s role in the 
region is declining and that it is no longer a great authority that is feared (or at least 
heard) on Middle Eastern issues and conflicts”. Before the recent uprisings, Egypt 
was widely seen as a Police State that manages oppressive prison system and torture 
chambers. The allegations of corruption and human right abuses were publicly 
reported against its authoritarian regime .The image of an overpopulated country with 
a poor economy and deteriorating regional status that mostly rely on its prestigious 
past has been regionally and globally crafted, which in turn has affected the Egyptian 
state as a whole (Hamzawy , 2010). 
In the post-Arab spring Egypt, many questions have been raised about the capacity of 
June  thIn the wake of the 30the state to promote its actions and policies globally. 
events, the Egyptian media, both state and private, failed to report, present, and/or 
communicate what was truly happening in the country. The Egyptian narrative was 
nothing but an outdated state-driven propaganda dominated by peculiar conspiracy 
theories, frantic patriotism and warlike mindsets. The government has remained 
defenseless in dealing the global attack fueled by foreign media against the Egyptian 
state. The western coverage of the June events was biased and polarized promoting 
one-sided narratives (Hamdy, 2015; Shukrallah, 2013; Abou Bakr, 2013). For 
example, A New York Times (NYT) story described Mohamed Baradei as one of 
interim President Adly Mansour's vice-presidents, while in the reality, there was only 
one, Baradei himself, some weeks later, an story run by the International Herald 
Tribune described defense minister Abdel-Fatah El-Sisi as Egypt's vice president, 
although, definitely, he never occupy such post (Shukrallah,2013). According to 
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Shukrallah, these mistakes were not coincidental, at least on a subconscious level, as 
the editors could have been carefully followed the Egyptian scene or even easily 
clicked away through Google search before writing their sorties. Since Baradei is 
rather positively perceived by NYT readers, he cannot be the only Vice-President 
(which may leave a good impression about the so-called military Coup on the 
readers), but one among others .El- Sisi, in his turn, is the head of the serpent, and the 
mastermind of the Coup. Seeing that being the minister of defense is not enough, he 
must evolve into something bigger, i.e. the Vice President. Indeed, most western 
, the Washington th30 June media decided to label what happed as a "coup". On the
Post reported on mass protests against Mohamed Morsi, former Egyptian President, 
and his Islamic regime, under the vague headline: "Tension roils Egypt as protests 
grow". The Economist went beyond that to be more biased describing the events as 
"Egypt Tragedy" (Abou Bakr, 2013). 
The government's failure to engage in global dialogue with the outside world 
on what was really happening in the country raises a question about "who tells the 
story of Egypt to the international community?", which is the main scope of the study. 
Institutions of Public Diplomacy in Egypt 
  Each country has a different set of institutions to manage its public diplomacy 
strategy and export its image abroad. The study focuses on the public diplomacy 
strategy and the agenda-building function of the two of main informational bodies in 
the Egyptian state: the State Information Service (SIS), and the public diplomacy 
division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which is officially affiliated to the 
Spokesman Office in the ministry. The SIS is officially described as the nation's main 
informational, awareness and public relations agency (as stated on its official 
website). The Information Department, later known as the SIS, was established in 
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1954, with two main functions: 1) Domestic mobilization, and 2) Foreign media 
communications (Appendix 3). The department turned into the State Information 
Service by the decree No.1820 of 1967 and affiliated to the Ministry of National 
Guidance, later known as the Ministry of Information (Appendix 4). Afterwards, the 
affiliation of the SIS was transferred from the ministry to the presidency in 2012 due 
to the abolishment of the Ministry of Information (Appendix 5). The SIS has three 
main divisions: 1) The Domestic Information Division, with wide network of 64 
domestic offices across the country, 2) The Foreign Media Division, that manages 
foreign media communications running 16 overseas press offices, and 3) The Press 
Center, that is responsible for authorizing foreign correspondents and reporters 
working in Egypt, and facilitating their work.  As the public diplomacy is the main 
concern of this thesis, the study focuses on the Foreign Media Division and the Press 
Center, and not as much on the irrespective domestic information services of the SIS. 
 The study explores public diplomacy strategies followed by the SIS and the 
Spokesman Office, and whether those strategies serve the Agenda-building function 
that is able to transfer silence of issues from the country's agenda to that of 
International public opinion, which can effectively promote Egypt's national interests 
and achieve foreign policy goals as well as enhance its image and role in the global 
community. In short, the ultimate goal of this study is to address the prospects of 
Egyptian public diplomacy and challenges limiting its applicability, as well as to 
recommend better structures, strategies, and priorities of the types of public 
diplomacy that Egypt could adopt. 
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Chapter Four  
Methodology   
This study is a qualitative research with a case study methodology. The in-
depth interviews and field observation were conducted to understand how the SIS and 
the Spokesman Office in the MFA approach public diplomacy. The study focuses on 
the analysis of public diplomacy strategies followed by two bodies and the capacity of 
those strategies to serve agenda-building function that can influence international 
public opinion. Because of the analytical aspect of the study and its focus on how 
certain government bodies approach public diplomacy, qualitative methods were the 
most appropriate in answering the research questions.  
Qualitative research  
The qualitative method is the most suitable approach to be utilized in this 
study because it allows the researcher to trace the efforts of the SIS and the 
Spokesman Office in the field of public diplomacy through collecting adequate data 
and information needed. The qualitative method provides an interpretive paradigm 
that helps the researcher to profoundly understand the phenomenon under 
investigation (Wimmer & Dominick, 2014).  . Due to the flexibility of the qualitative 
measurements, the researcher recognized, during the analysis, new areas of interest 
that were not addressed before. For example, in the beginning of the research, the SIS 
was the main and only focus of the study, but after interviewing eight of the SIS 
senior employees and drawing initial conclusions, the researcher recognized that there 
was a pressing need to present the view of the MFA in the study. The initial 
conclusion referred to the strong relevancy, and sometime overlapping themes, 
between the two institutions in the context of public diplomacy. As the research 
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progresses, the design evolves and the researcher decided to study the public 
diplomacy division in the MFA, which is officially affiliated to the Spokesman Office 
in the ministry, in addition to the SIS.  
Case Study 
The case study design perfectly fits the purpose and the goal of this research. 
According to Yin (2003), the case study method helps the researcher to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, in which the barriers between 
the phenomenon and its context are blurred. In this research, investigating the political 
and cultural contexts is a necessity to understand how certain government bodies 
approach public diplomacy. Cultural and political contexts greatly influence public 
diplomacy planning and strategies (Nye 2008; McClellan 2004; Khakimova 2013; 
Sheafer&Gabay 2009). In this research, the detailed descriptive nature of the case 
study design helps the researcher to cover the contextual conditions of issues at hand. 
On the other hand, the case study is a heuristic design that helps to explore new 
interpretations, dimensions, meanings, and unprecedented insights (Merriam 1988). 
Wimmer and Dominick (2014) suggested that the case study is particularly helpful for 
the researcher who does not know what exactly he/she is looking for. In addition, this 
typically applies to the researcher who attempted to study public diplomacy strategies, 
if any, in the Egyptian government bodies. Egyptian public diplomacy is relatively a 
new area of study. When it comes to public diplomacy literature, Egypt, like most 
developing countries, falls at the receiving end as a target not an advocate country 
(Classman& Glickman 2011;Glal 2010; Douglas& Neal 2013) . That is why the case 
study is most valuable in this research to find new clues and ideas for further research 
in the future.  
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In-Depth Interviews  
In-depth interviews or intensive interviews are the most suitable research tools 
for such study.  They help the researcher to collect different views about the 
phenomenon under investigation. Through conducting in-depth interviews, the 
researcher can gather wealth of detailed data about interviewees' values, opinions and 
experiences. Unlike surveys, in-depth interviews allow the researcher to observe non-
verbal responses, and explore the hidden motives behind specific answers. On the 
other hand, because of the political nature of the research topic and the sensitive 
positions of the interviewees, in-depth interview is particularly advantageous in this 
study. Wimmer and Dominick (2014) suggested that the long duration of in-depth 
interviews help develop a rapport between the respondents and the interviewer, which 
gives an edge to the researcher to approach certain topics that might be anathemas in 
other methods.  
Field observation  
Like all qualitative methods, field observation focuses on description and 
explanation rather than measurement and quantification. Studying the activities under 
investigation in their natural setting is one of the main advantages that might give the 
field observation an edge over other approaches (Wimmer & Dominick, 2014). In this 
study, field observation is a peripheral research method. It is utilized mainly to 
develop follow-up questions, and help the researcher to adjust the structure of 
interviews as the research progresses. 
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Research Design and Sampling 
The research focused on the State Information Service (SIS) and the 
Spokesman Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as a case study to 
investigate the strategies they follow to approach Egyptian public diplomacy. Twenty 
in-depth interviews were conducted with senior employees in the two bodies. 
Participants were recruited using a combination of purposive and snowballing 
sampling techniques. Some participants were interviewed purposefully because they 
meet the criteria of the study; such as the head of the Spokesman Office (the Official 
Spokesman) and the current chairman of the SIS.  Some participants were recruited 
using snowballing method. At the end of each interview, the researcher asked if the 
interviewee could recommend another participant to take part in the study. Two of the 
former SIS chairmen were interviewed this way.  
In the beginning of the study, the researcher spent one week in the SIS 
headquarter:, six hours daily from 10 am to 4 pm. During one week of the overt  field 
observation in which the researcher was identified when the study began, the first 
eighth in-depth interviews were conducted. The initial conclusion suggested that there 
was a need to investigate the efforts of the foreign ministry done in the field of public 
diplomacy due to the strong relevancy between the functions and job descriptions of 
the two bodies in the context of public diplomacy. The decision was made to focus on 
the public diplomacy division in the MFA. The researcher investigated the 
Spokesman Office to which the public diplomacy division is affiliated. Five in-depth 
interviews were conducted with diplomats working in the office including the official 
spokesman. After that, the researcher spent another week in the SIS headquarter in 
which the rest of interviews were conducted. 
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Twenty semi-structured face-to-face interviews with senior employees in the 
two bodies were conducted. The participants varied including diplomats, media 
researchers, press attaches, and former heads of press offices who were in charge of 
communication in Egyptian embassies abroad. Each interview lasted between 30 
minutes and two hours, and three interviews of the twenty took two sessions. The 
researcher used the interview protocol consisting of three parts: the first part focused 
on the definition and dimensions of public diplomacy in the two bodies, and included 
questions such as “how do define public diplomacy?” and “Is the term frequently used 
in the work? Why yes? Why not?” The second part of the protocol focused on the 
strategies they follow to influence international public opinion in order to promote 
Egyptian interests and improve the national persona of the country abroad, and 
included questions such as “what are the techniques you use to communicate with 
foreign publics abroad” and “How does your institution address the Egyptian events, 
positions and policies to the rest of the world? The third part focused on the 
challenges and obstacles that might undermine their public diplomacy efforts. The list 
of the interviewing questions is provided at the end of this chapter (Appendix 1). On 
the other hand, the field observation helped the researcher add new questions and 
explore new areas of interest during the research. 
Out of the twenty interviews, four interviewees accepted to participate in the 
study on the condition of anonymity. Otherwise, the list of the sixteen participants is 
provided at the end of this chapter (Appendix 2); along with their titles and positions. 
All participants gave an oral consent to participate in the research, in line with the 
approval of the Institutional Review Board. Because of the political nature of the 
research and the limitations of sharing inside information that are often imposed on 
diplomats and government employees, the written consent to participate in the study 
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was almost impossible, and some participants shared a lot of useful and valuable 
information on the condition of being “off record”. “This is for your own information, 
don’t write about it”: such phrases, and similar ones, were frequently repeated during 
the study. Moreover, the interviews were summarized based on the researcher’s 
detailed notes because the participants did not want to be recorded. 
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Chapter Five 
Findings and Analysis     
Definitions and Dimensions: 
The first research question sought to explore how the Egyptian institutions 
represented by the State Information Service (SIS) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) define public diplomacy. Overall, the majority of interviewed participants 
shared misconception and confusion about public diplomacy in theory and practice. 
For example, in the MFA most of the interviewees did not differentiate between the 
efforts they exert to improve the image of the ministry in the Egyptian society and the 
tactics they apply to improve the image of Egypt to the outside world. In the SIS, the 
term "public diplomacy" is not frequently used. Most of the SIS officials referred to 
their communication efforts and advocacy works within the context of overseas image 
management. For example, one participant said, "we don't usually use the term ‘public 
diplomacy’, but we do the same under different labels."  Also the majority of the 
participants emphasized the importance of the manipulative strategies, including 
covering up and presenting one-sided story, in promoting positive image about the 
country.  
Three themes emerged related to the definition of public diplomacy and the 
basic philosophy behind its practice in the two Egyptian institutions: (1) no distinction 
between public affairs and public diplomacy; (2) domination of propaganda over 
promotional efforts; (3) public diplomacy efforts serving the regime rather than the 
state. 
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No distinction between public affairs and public diplomacy 
 Data analysis suggested that public diplomacy, particularly in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, was widely defined as a process of communications with media 
(domestic or foreign) to explain the government’s actions and motives, as well as 
defend the state's positions and policies, to influence public opinion domestically and 
abroad. Almost all diplomats that were interviewed talked about the ministry’s efforts 
to respond to media inquires without differentiation between the foreign and the 
domestic. For example, about public diplomacy efforts, one participant said: 
We are keen to keep an open channel with media, and establish a good 
relation with journalists and correspondents. Recently the spokesman has 
made a lot of interviews. He has at least two calls weekly in different TV 
Shows to explain the views and positions of the MFA to the public. Actually, 
the man has wide media contacts and good relation with almost everyone in 
this field. 
 Such answer reflects the confusion about the ministry's commitment toward 
the Egyptian citizens to be kept informed about the country's foreign policy decisions 
and strategies, and the ministry's role in promoting the Egyptian values and policies to 
the outside world in the way that facilitate the interests of the country in the global 
arena. 
 Moreover, the organizational structure of the Spokesman Office reflects this 
confusion. The office has three subdivisions: (1) media center for monitoring media, 
mainly the Egyptian and Arabic media, for all significant mentions of the ministry and 
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follow what is published and broadcasted about the domestic, regional and 
international affairs; (2) internet unit that is in charge of managing the ministry's 
official website and uploading data and news of the ministry and Egypt's embassies 
abroad; (3) public diplomacy division. According to one participant, the public 
diplomacy division has no certain job description. it is a very small division with one 
diplomat plus the administrative staff. The division has nothing to do with foreign 
media. And most interestingly that unlike the media center and internet unit, public 
diplomacy is the only division in the Spokesman Office that is not directly affiliated 
to the Minister Office, and it is just working under the jurisdiction of the Spokesman. 
 Indeed, the status of the public diplomacy division in the MFA indicates to the 
misinterpretation of the concept in theory and practice. In general, several participants 
used the term "public diplomacy" as a label to describe some media relations and 
public affairs activities.  
Similarly, another participant from the SIS said: 
We speak to ourselves all the time. In Egypt, we have 98 TV anchors, and no 
one of them target foreign audiences.  They usually host Egyptian guests and 
experts speaking Arabic, utilizing our domestic values, norms and contexts, 
and then they act like someone from the outside listening to them.  
 Such misinterpretation may hinder the government from properly 
communicating its massage to the global environment. Heller and Persson (2009) 
clarified the difference between the Public Affairs massage, that targets domestic 
population, and the Public Diplomacy massage, that is designed to influence foreign 
populations. Unlike public affairs, public diplomacy efforts include not only 
conveying the message that a country wishes to promote abroad, but also analyzing 
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and understanding the perceptions of target nations and the way that message is 
decoded by different societies (Heller& Persson, 2009). Targeting foreign audiences 
requires the development of more sophisticated persuasive mechanisms and 
communicative capacities in order to increase attraction and influence. 
Domination of propaganda over promotional efforts 
The second aspect characterizing the interpretation of public diplomacy in the SIS and 
MFA was the propagandistic approach that formed their understanding and analysis 
of public diplomacy efforts. Several participants emphasized the significance of 
manipulative mechanisms in reshaping the global mental environment to be aligned 
with the state's direction. For example, one senior official in the SIS appreciated the 
act of covering up saying: 
Our media is irresponsible. Are you talking about public diplomacy, how 
come? With such media!! They help the terrorists by broadcasting their 
actions and crimes 24/7. They unintentionally propagate their ideology and 
thoughts. They harm the country and negatively affect tourism. To be the 
fastest newspaper or channel to cover the event, it is the first or may be the 
only thing they care about.  
 Participants expressed many initiatives that have been developed in the wake 
of the 30th of June to improve the image of the state worldwide and counter the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s global narrative on what occurred in the country. Most of 
these initiatives have fallen into what can be described as "propaganda", which 
involved intentions of covering up and controlling information disseminated to 
foreign public. For example, one of the post-30th June initiatives is called “Letter from 
Cairo". It is a form of soft-copy information subsidies that has been issued by the SIS 
 61 
twice monthly; in four languages: Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. "Letter from 
Cairo" is designed to be sent to the electronic mailbox of foreign correspondents and 
embassies in Egypt as well as the Egyptian embassies abroad. According to one 
participant, the main purpose of such electronic publication is to promote Egypt as a 
stable state and transfer the newscast of the Egyptian society away from terrorism and 
political conflicts. He said, "we need the others to see that Egyptians practicing their 
life as normal". However, by the interviews were conducted, “Letter From Cairo” had 
only four special one-topic issues: one issue on the Egypt Economic Development 
Conference that was held in Sharm El-Shiek on (13th -15th) March 2015 to attract 
foreign investors, two issues on the New Suez Canal ( before and after the opening of 
the canal), and one issue on the violence and bloody practices of  Muslim 
Brotherhood across history.    
  The difficulty in that is this kind of initiatives involve what Leonard (2002) 
has called a battleground of "your information vs. my information". Most of the SIS 
publications are aimed at winning arguments and demonstrating that "we are right", 
rather than inducing audiences to alter their opinion. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood 
narrative that utilized symbols, words and actions in communicating their messages, 
the majority of post-30th June state initiatives were declamatory that involved telling 
and supplying information rather than capturing the imagination. For instance, the 
communicative power of the "four-finger salute" of Muslim Brotherhood was much 
more influential than the state cliché of "Egypt fights terrorism."  
It is also worth noting that the interviews were conducted after the inauguration of the 
New Suez Canal. Everyone was exited. Some participants talked about the SIS efforts 
Like all Egyptian state officials and media outlets, the to promote the project globally. 
glorifying the  toSIS was part of the government intensive campaign customized 
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 globallydomestically and  selling it off ‘New Suez Canal’ as Egypt’s national project 
.  as ‘Egypt’s Gift to the World’ 
Public diplomacy efforts serving the regime rather than the state 
 Date Analysis suggested that one of the major sources of confusion in 
practicing public diplomacy in the two Egyptian institutions, particularly the SIS, is 
being merely the mouthpiece of the regime. Glorifying the successive presidents of 
the country across different ears has been the main purpose and aim of public 
diplomacy patterns that the SIS has followed since its establishment in 1954. 
Although the SIS has been defined in the act of its establishment as the nation's main 
informational, awareness, and public relation, several participants emphasized that it 
has been always worked to serve the regime rather than the nation. One participant 
said: 
 Like all state media, the SIS is part of the system that is built to promote one 
person, and improve the image of one person: the president, whoever is.  
That can be illustrated in various practices in the SIS. For Example, some 
participants, on condition of anonymity, talked about the role that some 
Egyptian press offices abroad (particularly in the USA, UK, and the biggest 
countries in the EU) played in promoting Gamal Mubarak succession plans 
for assuming power after his father. according to one participant, the head 
of those press offices had been purposely appointed by the regime and were 
always closely tied to the ruling family in one way or another. Another 
participant said, "selling Gamal Mubarak to the west was the main task  of 
those offices in last ten year of Mubarak era". Even after the Arab-Spring 
uprisings, the mindset of the institution remains the same. For instance, It is 
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true that the SIS stops publishing an annual book about the president's 
achievements right after the 2011 revolution, but they come up with a new 
version of it by  issuing an annual book about the president's foreign visits 
each year. 
 According to several participants, the main reason behind the confusion and 
inconsistency in the Egyptian message to the outside world, in the last five years, is 
the blind commitment of the SIS and other institutions representing the country 
abroad to be the voice of the regime that changed rapidly and continuously since the 
the revolution of the 25th of January. They are used to completely changing the tone 
and content of their messages as soon as a new president took office. For example, 
one participant stated the following: 
 It is over. We lost our credibility abroad.  It is enough to know that one of 
our colleagues in a hosting country appeared on TV two times in the same 
show in one month (before and after the 30th June events), using certain 
arguments about explaining the status quo in Egypt, and then he almost 
said the opposite in the second time after the events. 
The above-mentioned answers reflect what Abdulla (2014) has described as 
the unchangeable authoritarian mindset of Egyptian media. The state media continued 
their previous fashion, with one distinction that the Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces (SCAF), then the Muslim-Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, and President 
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi replaced Hosni Mubarak afterwards.  The same media figures 
and outlets that described Mubarak once as the wise protector of the state, soon 
started to glorify El-Sisi as the brave savor of the nation.  Such rhetoric has limited 
the credibility of Egyptian government abroad, which has undermined its 
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communicative capacity to reach foreign audiences’ hearts and minds.  As one 
participant said, " credibility is something that hard to gain and easy to lose". 
Similarly, Heller and Persson (2009) emphasize that any dent in credibility is difficult 
to repair, especially in foreign settings, as publics are generally skeptical of foreign 
governments' articulations and actions. 
 
The continuation of this sort of public diplomacy, that includes blind 
commitment to the policy makers' decisions through merely promoting government 
policies and positions, may cause damage to the image and reputation of the country 
across the world. The effective public diplomacy must have a channel to give 
recommendations for policy making and these recommendations must be considered 
and appropriately evaluated by the government as "the conclusive feedback of the 
market" (Anhold 2006). Otherwise, public diplomacy efforts are unserviceable, or 
even counterproductive, as a globally unpopular government may on a long run do 
harm the national image of the country and its overall longer-term interests.  
 
 Strategies and Tactics 
The second research question asked was what are the strategies followed by 
the SIS and MFA to influence international public opinion in order to create favorable 
environment to facilitate Egyptian interests abroad. Overall, the majority of 
participants emphasized the lack of strategic planning inside their institutions. For 
example, one participant said, "we don't have a set of strategic messages to promote 
about Egypt, and it is all about personal initiatives." Indeed, Data suggested that the 
main public diplomacy strategies at the two institutions related to media relations, 
which includes building relationships with domestic media in hosting countries and 
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keeping in touch with foreign correspondents in the country. On the other hand, 
findings indicated that the major tasks of most communication officers in these 
institutions focus on daily news management, tracking negative propaganda about 
Egypt published in foreign media, and preparing proper responses. 
 
Three themes emerged related to the strategies of public diplomacy and the 
techniques applied in the SIS and MFA to create favorable global public opinion 
about Egypt: (1) the lack of strategy; (2) predominance of media relations and one-
way communication; (3) focus on reactive approach and avoidance of on-record 
comments. 
 
The lack of strategy  
According to the majority of participants, there is no clear, consistent 
communication strategy to guide their efforts to reach and influence foreign publics 
for many reasons. First, the lack of coordination and interoperability among the 
different institutions that are responsible for promoting Egypt abroad, which in turn 
undermines the totality of Egyptian messages to the outside world. There are several 
institutions working abroad: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represented by 
embassies, State Information Service represented by media offices, the Ministry of 
Higher Education represented by cultural offices, the Ministry of Trade represented 
by commercial offices, and Tourism Board. However, All work like isolated islands. 
 Accordingly, the government become unable to manage perceptions of the 
country abroad due to the lack of strategic messages and the absence of a clear 
national narrative that can bring the different stakeholders together.  
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Second, the separation between policy and public diplomacy obstruct any 
attempts to develop effective communication strategies. A host of participants 
emphasized their absent role in the decision-making process stating that they have 
never had a seat on policy-making table across the history of the SIS. Nasser 
established the institution mainly to tell what was written and broadcasted about the 
regime in western media. Then, Sadat depended mostly on western media to build his 
image and convey Egyptian messages to the outside world. During Mubark era, there 
was recession in everything, in politics, in media. The role of the SIS was marginal 
focusing only on receiving foreign correspondents, facilitating their work and  
organizing press delegations accompanied the president during his foreign visits. 
 Several participants emphasized the inability to develop their own communication 
goals and strategies is due to their lack of executive and restrictions of their power. 
They do not have a say when it comes to policymaking process. One participant said, 
"Sometimes we promote something, and then the decision maker do the opposite 
without pre notice". The 2009 Egypt-versus-Algeria football matches provides a vivid 
example. While the diplomats and communication officers at the Egyptian embassy in 
Algeria was trying to calm down furious publics on the ground, the Egyptian ruling 
family escalated the situation. Alaa Mubarak telephoned a talk show saying, "We are 
Egyptian and we hold our head high, and whoever insults us should be smacked on 
his head."  Hosni Mubarak said on national television that he would not condone the 
"humiliation" of Egyptians abroad.  
 
Third, there is no communication strategy without a sound resourced, wisely 
managed information strategy. Data suggested that the absence of information and 
constraints imposing on actual facts, numbers and statistics usually end up being 
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accused by foreign media of covering up and dilution of transparency. In the words of 
one participant:  
There is no influence without information.  They do not even frequently 
distribute talking points. We are on our own most of the time, and this 
problem is usually aggravated during the time of crises.  
Another participant said: 
We do not learn from our mistakes: what happened during the January 25th 
revolution was typically repeated during the June 30th events. No one told 
you what is going on. The only difference is that the outside world, 
particularly the west, was more acceptable and supportive to the January. 
It was like a free publicity for the country. But, we did nothing through the 
two revolutions: no information, no influence, and everyone was talking 
according to his/her personal information.  
 
Moreover, the findings propose that the random closure of Egyptian media 
offices abroad reflected the government's little appreciation to public diplomacy 
planning and strategic communication. The closure was justified by the government 
as  a cost-effectiveness procedure. Egypt had 69 overseas media offices during 1980s, 
but now it only 16 offices. According to several participants,  It was a random process 
as they did so without vision or clear alternatives.  
 The government closed media offices: (1) in Rome, which has the highest 
ratio of an Egyptian community in the Europe; (2) in Madrid, which is considered the 
only bridge to the Spanish-speaking nations since all media offices in Latin America 
had already closed a long time ago; (3) in Dakar, which held the only media office 
targeting French-speaking African countries because the five  Egyptian media offices 
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in Africa are based in English-speaking countries; (4) in Tunisia, that is considered 
the center of culture and civilization in the Greater Maghreb, and at the same time the 
media offices in Algeria and Rabat remained. According to one participant, if the 
government was thinking strategically, they would have closed media offices in 
Algeria and Rabat and left the office in Tunisia open. Tunisia is the most important 
country in that region when it comes to communication and cultural activities. 
 
Predominance of media relations and one-way communication 
Findings proposed that the main communication strategies in the SIS and 
MFA relate to media relations. While few participants were talking about their efforts 
to communicate with cultural and educational institutions abroad, the majority of 
participants emphasized that their main responsibilities concentrate on building strong 
relationships with foreign journalists and correspondents. Several participants talked 
about tactics they applied to keep in touch with foreign journalists including official 
arrangements like monthly briefings, press tours and off-record meetings, as well as 
informal gatherings like family events and lunch appointments. For them, maintaining 
good relationships with journalists is essential in their work to get messages 
disseminated and responses published in the right time, particularly during crises. 
According to another participant, the role played by the prominent Egyptian-
born British journalist "Adel Darwish" through the 30th June events provide a vivid 
example as the Egyptian embassy in London has been always been profound on 
keeping in communication with Darwish, who greatly participated in promoting the 
Egyptian narrative on the events occurring in the United Kingdom. He was trying to 
counter the Muslim Brotherhood propaganda in London and explained to the British 
public what was going on in Egypt using his leverage as a famous trust-worthy 
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journalist and intellectual. In addition, many participants stressed the necessity of 
being a media-oriented person to being a respectable overseas communication officer. 
One participant said: 
Diplomats cannot do our works.  You need someone who understand media 
norms and professional values of journalism to be able to deal with foreign 
media every day. Journalists feel more comfortable when they talk to 
someone like them. 
 
The one-way communication approach is dominant in the two Egyptian 
institutions. The reliance on media relations as a major communication strategy 
reflects the focus on massage dissemination that aims to inform rather than engage 
with foreign publics. Despite the attempts to use Facebook, Twitter and blog 
platforms inside the MFA, the practice did not reflect the connectivity and 
interactivity of such new media. The purpose was primarily to disseminate 
information rather than engage in a conversation. For example, the blog of MFA 
looked more like an official website to publish news. The new Facebook and Twitter 
accounts created by the Spokesman Office seemed like monologues with few 
comments. 
 
Some participants talked about their duty to communicate with Egyptian communities 
overseas and connect them with their mother country. Some of Egyptian immigrants 
can be potential investors in the future while others can work as cultural 
interpretations to bridge between Egyptian culture and those of their resident 
countries.                   
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      On the other hand, Data suggested that the majority of participants showed little 
appreciation for working with non-state actors like NGOs to promote Egyptian 
interests abroad. For example, one participant said: 
We do cooperate with NGOs. I mean the like-minded ones. Those who 
follow the direction of the state, but they are few. And this is the problem.   
        Another participant emphasized the domestic nature of Egyptian NGOs stating: 
The majority of Egyptian NGOs do not care about the image of 
Egypt abroad. The internal affairs are their main concern. 
Some participants went beyond that to criticize the role of NGOs and blamed 
them for distorting the image of Egypt abroad.  In the words of one of the participant: 
Most of foreign NGOs have kind of “brainlessness" when it comes 
to human right. They exaggerate everything turning small incidents 
into critical violations.  On the other side, the Egyptian NGOs are 
just "mercenaries" who follow the agenda of those who fund them.   
The above mentioned answers proposed that Egyptian public diplomacy 
patterns fall within information frameworks in which messaging design and 
dissemination is the major concern (Zaharna, 2009). For example, the common 
recommendation among the participants for better public diplomacy practice focused 
on the necessity of exploring more effective massaging strategies. However, in cross-
culture settings, there is no evidence that merely messaging can change perceptions as 
massages are always prone to different interpretations or may be distorted (Anholt 
2006; Nye, 2008) .  According to Zaharna (2009), information initiatives restrict the 
interaction between the political sponsor and the target audience through employing 
communication as a linear process with a one-way flow of information. 
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Focus on reactive approach and avoidance of on-record comments 
Findings proposed that the main tactics used by the SIS and MFA to counter 
negative media coverage about the county in foreign news reports are based on 
reactive approaches. The majority of participants emphasized the importance of 
correcting inaccuracies and falsehood that appeared about Egypt in foreign media. 
Participants demonstrated that one of the primary duties of each communication 
officer at our embassies abroad is to trace any corrupt mention of the country and 
quickly respond. 
 
This approach might be strongly reflected in a new body called "Fact Check 
Egypt" (FCE), which is created by the SIS to oversee foreign media outlets and their 
sources. The initiative appeared as a respond to the continued negative coverage of 
international media about the Egyptian state's policies and actions since the 30thof 
June events, particularly right after several foreign publications reported significantly 
higher death tolls than the army's official statement in awake of the Sinai deadly 
attacks on armed forces by the Islamic state militants on the 4th July 2015. The staff of 
the new body is trained by an American NGO called "iMediaEhics", whose website 
publishes news and articles that investigate inaccuracies and ethical shortcomings in 
news media. According to its director, the FCE is a fact checking and media ethics 
news that aims to counter misinformation rather than impose censorship on media 
reporters. However, the FCE has been widely criticized by several foreign reporters 
depicting it as a government attempt to intimidate foreign media and force them to 
follow the direction of the state.  Accroding to Jone (2015), Ruth Michaelson,, a 
correspondent with Radio France International's English Service, who received an 
email from Fact Check Egypt asking for corrections said:  
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This tactic seems to be designed to do is make us doubt ourselves 
and our reporting, to feel under attack and to refrain in future from 
reporting things that aren't the official narrative  
On the other hand, several participants mentioned the avoidance of on-record 
comments as a tactic followed by many Egyptian officials, particularly since the 
25thof January revolution. According to the MFA Spokesman, the office exerts many 
efforts to communicate with the domestic departments involved in the issues and 
crises that concern foreign media, as no one want to speak to foreign media: neither 
police nor judiciary. They do not have such culture. The Foreign Service try to bridge 
between foreign reporters and Egyptian officials by get the information needed to 
contextualize domestic stories and communicate with foreign media. However it is 
not an easy job. 
 Similarly, one participant said: 
Sticking with silence sometime put them in embarrassing situations. I knew 
one ambassador decided once not to comment on a big accident and 
disappeared for two weeks, and then reporters chased him in the elevator 
forcing him to comment. He was totally unprepared and looked as if 
someone went to an interview in a pajama. 
 
In general, the mere focus on reactive approaches limits the persuasive 
capacity of communications and undermines the agenda-building function of public 
diplomacy as it allows little planning and limited inputs into massaging. In the words 
of one participant: 
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In recent days, our main job has turned from advocacy to defense. We are 
always in the position of the defender or the apologizer, and the world does 
not respect both.  
According to Nye (2008), proactive approach is necessity as it represents a 
more advanced stage of public diplomacy. The proactive approach helps the political 
sponsor to have more influence over international agenda building as it provides more 
control and strategic planning into messaging. It is more persuasive and influential to 
create rather than correct. Leaonard (2002) proposes that the government must create 
public diplomacy strategies for all of the main issues they work on, and explore the 
communications angles of all their policies, decisions and actions.  
 
Challenges and Obstacles  
The third research question sought to address the challenges and obstacles that 
might undermine public diplomacy efforts in the SIS and MFA. Overall, the scope of 
answers to that question were the widest as the majority of participants always started 
to talk about the problems from which they suffer through their work at the beginning 
of the interview. Some interviews were merely a set of complaints rather than specific 
answers to the research questions. Data suggested that the challenges that might 
hinder the public diplomacy practice in the two government bodies were categorized 
into three basic themes: 1) cultural, social and political differences; 2) limited human 
and financial resources; 3) administrative, structural and legislative barriers.  
 
Cultural, social and political differences  
The findings propose that the socio-cultural dissimilarities and prejudices 
appeared during communications with foreign cultures disturb public diplomacy 
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dynamics. Some participants addressed the inability to understand what others believe 
and how they tackle major problem that might undermine communication efforts with 
foreign audiences. According to one participant, the formation of so-called public 
diplomacy delegations, especially those who usually accompany the president during 
his foreign visit, provides a vivid example of the nation's deficiency to communicate 
with the West. In the words of that participant: 
Do American people know Yossra?! And of course the German never heard 
about Elham Shahine, so what is the point?  If we really wanted to talk to 
the west, we should have sent the people who the west know and respect or 
at least appreciate their presence like our Noble-winners, Occidentalism-
interested intellectuals and thinkers, or maybe some promising youth or 
women. For those who don't know, the western audiences don't watch 
Egyptian drama!  
 
Another participant attributed the decline in the Egyptian role in Africa to the 
inability to understand and deal with the African mentality. The misperception of the 
African as underdeveloped and naive people is one of the key reasons behind the 
decline of Egypt's leadership potentials in the black continent. The failure to 
communicate properly with Africa hinder the country's capacity to deal with several 
issues such as the Nile basin crisis and the South Sudan separation. Recently, the SIS 
issued an online magazine named "Africa: Our Continent". The magazine targets 
Egyptian public and aims to reinforce the African identity in the minds and hearts of 
the Egyptian people.  
 
 75 
Data analysis suggested that some of communication officers in the two 
institutions work as cultural reserves with prejudices and presumptions rather than 
cultural interpreters with better understanding to others' social norms, political values 
and communication patterns. For example, one participant generally discredited 
foreign correspondence saying: "recently the majority of foreign correspondents have 
turned into political activists rather than neutral reporters".  Form his perspective, 
foreign correspondents, including those who work for the significantly reputable 
international newspapers, lack professionalism and objectivity as they always have 
their own agenda that dominates their reporting technique. Another participant said, 
"Most foreign NGOs act in a brainless way when it comes to freedom and human 
right exaggerating everything". In addition, it is worth noting that cultural attachés at 
the Egyptian embassies are originally university professors affiliated to the Ministry 
of Higher Education. According to one participant, the main focus of Egyptian 
cultural attaches overseas to manage the affairs of Egyptian students abroad rather 
than promote better understanding between the Egyptian state and foreign publics. An 
overseas cultural attaché should have been an intellectual who is interested in cross-
culture communication and inter-faith dialogue rather than an university professor 
who cares mainly about academic engagement.   
 
In addition, the findings propose that differences in political values, foreign 
policy considerations, and bilateral relations between governments, can facilitate or 
obscure public diplomacy. For example, the majority of participants attributed the 
worldwide negative media coverage of the 30th of June uprising and the failure of the 
Egyptian state to promote its own narrative in foreign media, to the differences in 
political interests between the government of Egypt and those of western countries in 
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that historical moment. For western governments, it is not comprehensible, or even 
favorable to see such quick popular uprising of million Egyptians against what was 
widely perceived as one of the up-and-coming Islamic regimes across the region. The 
30th of June uprising countered the Western calculations that was capitalized on 
Islamists as a best alternative to semi-secular long-serving regimes in the Middle East. 
In the words of one participant: 
Do not blame us, it is all about them. The capacity of our institution- 
whatever strong or weak- remain the same during the two revolutions. But, 
the west expected and supported the January revolution, so it looked like 
for-free positive propaganda for the country. Then, things were reversed in 
the June revolution. It is as simple as that. 
 
Furthermore, the findings suggested that prior experiences and historical 
background of the target audience influences its perception and acceptance of the 
advocate country's agenda. For example, according to the former press attaché at the 
Egyptian embassy in Algeria, Algeria was among the first nations that provided 
support for the 30th of June uprising, as the Algerians are very much aware of how 
dangerous such Islamic movements could be. They suffered a lot from the Islamists' 
bloody violence during 1990s. 
 
On the contrary, another participant, who severed in Madrid emphasized that 
the Spanish recalled the picture of  the 1981 attempted coup that might have 
undermined the nation's transition to democracy, while they were evaluating the 30th 
of June events in Egypt. They depicted the uprising as a coup d'état refusing to listen 
to any counterargument. 
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The above-mentioned answers addressed the difference in cultural 
considerations and political values as a barrier that might undermine Egyptian public 
diplomacy efforts. It is true that several scholars stressed the importance of cultural 
and political consistency in cross-national communications (Sheafer& Gabay 2009; 
Curtin& Gaither 2004; Nye 2008), however, in the age of information and 
communication technologies, new public diplomacy strategies have emerged to 
facilitate better understanding among foreign cultures. For example, networking 
communications and relation-building activities have turned the cultural difference 
into an asset rather than a barrier, in which people exchange information and ideas for 
creating better world (Zaharna 2007). However, to apply such relational approach to 
public diplomacy efforts in Egypt, the culture of communication must be reinforced in 
the Egyptian mentality to be able to push the Egyptian narrative into global public 
opinion agenda. In his study on public diplomacy at Arab embassies in the U.S., 
Khakimova (2013) proposed that Americans show more appreciation for 
communication than Arabs, as some cultures are conditioned to believe their voices 
have a contributing and effective value, while other cultures do not possess that 
feature.          
 
Limited human and financial resources   
The finding proposed that the two institutions, particularly the SIS, suffer from 
sever lack of qualified, well-trained human resources.  Several participants stressed 
the absence of a full-capacity officer who would be able to communicate properly 
with foreign cultures. Data Analysis suggested that most communication officers who 
have good language skills, lack sufficient knowledge and communication capacities, 
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while those who are linguistically weak are usually more knowledgeable and well 
cultured. The main reasons behind that dilemma is the lack of human development 
initiatives and the absence of performance-based promotion and a rewarding system. 
One participant stated: 
There is no system. Unlike diplomats, we do not have an institutionalized 
corps for overseas press attaches. People get their posts based on 
patronage and nepotism calculations. It is very common to find an English-
speaking person serve in a French-speaking country, and someone who 
almost does not speak foreign languages got two or three posts during 
his/her career for very special reasons!  
 
In addition, the researcher noted that some press attaches were not able to 
differentiate between the political event and its communication angle. While they 
were being asked about public diplomacy efforts and communication strategies they 
followed during their posts abroad, some answered in a mere political context 
describing certain improvements on bilateral relations or explaining some foreign 
policy positions. This reflects the misconception about the correlating dimensions 
between policy and public diplomacy on one side, and the lack of communicative 
capacities on the other side. It is also worth noting that the average age of the SIS staff 
is relatively high, as the institution has stopped hiring since 2004.   
 
On the other hand,  lack of financial resources also undermine public 
diplomacy efforts. According to several participants, budgetary limitations usually 
restricted any initiatives for further cultural engagements and communication 
activities. 
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 One participants said: 
  Exchange programs need money. Exhibitions and cultural fairs need 
money.  Publications and film production need money. Many initiatives 
stopped before because of the lack of funding. Larger budget is required to 
do more programs. 
 
On the other hand, limited wages in the two institutions, particularly the SIS, 
undermine employees' commitment to their organization, which negatively affects the 
quality of work. Unlike overseas officers, desk officers and headquarter-based 
employees receive minimum wages. Average salaries are below the market rate. For 
example, the researcher noted that the main concern of the majority of the SIS 
employees is to increase their incomes, following the January revolution's call for a 
revised minimum wage set by the government. The researcher even witnessed one 
strike in which several employees protested against the chairman for merely financial 
motives. For those employees, there is no time or energy to think about public 
diplomacy, or to come up with new ideas to improve the image of the country abroad. 
 
Legislative, structural and administrative barriers  
Data Analysis suggested that the legislative framework that regulates the 
function and structure of the SIS does not address changing dynamics in the domestic 
and global political environment. According to the Decree No.1820 of 1967 on the 
establishment of the SIS (Appendix 4), the main focus of the institution is 
information production and dissemination to promote the state's policies, trends and 
resolutions.  As stated in the 1967 decree, the two key purposes of the SIS work are: 
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(1) to mobilize domestic audiences to endorse the state's polices and plans, and 
deepen socialist concepts among the public; (2) to inform the world public opinion of 
the objectives of the socialist society and the trends of the United Arab Republic 
toward the world problems.  In fact, the decree of the establishment utilized what can 
be described nowadays as outdated and old-fashion concepts and frameworks.  
However, the 1967 decree is still valid, represented in the major legal basis for the 
SIS functions and activities. In the words of one participant to the researcher: 
While you are asking about public diplomacy efforts, the cooperation with 
NGOs and the use of information and communication technologies, it is 
worth to know that none of those concepts mentioned in the SIS's 
documented regulations. Until this moment, we are working according to 
the 1967 decree that was taking about the socialist concepts and the values 
of nation work addressing Egypt as the United Arab Republic, and 
stressing the importance of cooperation with Arab Socialist Union 
Agencies!  
 
Like most governmental institutions in Egypt, the SIS suffers many 
bureaucratic diseases including weak performance, interruptions and time-consuming 
processes, lack of information, centralized administration, and duplicative and 
overlapping responsibilities. It is also overstaffed with 3200 employees including, 
only, 620 media staff and communication officers. The majority of the SIS employees 
are typical bureaucrats with limited action and fear of responsibility. For example, the 
researcher noted that there were overwhelming requests to either leave work early or 
take a vacation from the employees during the two weeks of the study.        
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The bureaucratic structure of the SIS is negatively reflected on the 
performance of its media offices abroad. These media offices are dependent on the 
SIS headquarter as overseas press attaches could not issue statements without the 
permissions of the SIS administration at home. The complexity of internal 
communication, lack of information, and delays, influence the relation with foreign 
media and limit the interaction between press attaches and reporters in host countries. 
In words of one participant: 
Our main problem is the delay. We are always late, and in the court of 
international public opinion, the rule is that who precedes gain all 
sympathy 
Another participant said: 
We deal with a very bureaucratic institution while foreign reporters are 
dealing with International news agencies. They were calling me to get a 
response about certain things. Sometimes I did not respond because either 
the SIS didn't provide me with information or because the ambassador 
didn't want me to respond for some reasons he is the only one knew about. 
At the end of the day, foreign reporters got their information from new 
agencies and published one-sided stories. We became the big losers. 
 
Similarly, Egyptian embassies have little autonomy from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. According to one participant, embassies could neither disseminate 
any news nor issue press releases without the permission of the Spokesman Office in 
the MFA. Every piece of information produced abroad must be sent to the mailbox of 
the MFA's Spokesman. The headquarter-based Spokesman Office has the full 
authority to decide which information is newsworthy and thusly to appear on the 
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ministry's official website. In general, the major focus of Egyptian embassies abroad 
is to deliver messages rather than design them. Sometime, the state selects to bypass 
its embassies hiring foreign public relation companies to promote certain messages 
and policies without involving the embassies. 
 
On the other hand, data suggested that power relations between the SIS and 
the MFA are not clearly defined. According to the SIS employees, there is a kind of 
institutional control from the Foreign Affairs over the SIS headquarter and its media 
offices abroad. Ambassadors have always been appointed to occupying the office of 
the chairpersons of the SIS. For the SIS staff, the majority of ambassadors are not 
media-oriented individuals, thus they are lacking the art and craft of the profession. 
They usually held their position on a temporarily basis, which influences the stability 
and efficiency of the institution. For example, one participant said, "most of those 
ambassadors were just physically inside the SIS, but mentally they were thinking 
about their next post abroad".  However, findings proposed that from the MFA 
perspective, the SIS is a typical government institution with many bureaucratic 
illnesses, which severely affects its capacity to represent the country abroad. 
According to one participant, there has been a proposal to abolish the SIS and transfer 
its overseas functions to the MFA. 
 
The above-mentioned findings propose that the SIS is a weak bureaucracy 
with minimum resources and influence, which stresses the need to a new public 
diplomacy structure. To reinforce the power of public diplomacy, therefore a new 
system must emerge to involve public diplomats at the planning stage of the foreign 
policy making process (Seib 2009). Restructuring Egyptian public diplomacy requires 
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establishing a strong bureaucracy with a direct link between policy makers in the 
country. According to Cull (2008), the great public diplomacy leaders have been close 
friends to their respective presidents.     
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Conclusive Remarks  
Overall, the analysis of public diplomacy strategies followed by the State 
Information Service (SIS) and the Spokesman Office in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) reflected the lack of strategic communication planning to reach and 
influence foreign publics in the two institutions. Egyptian public diplomacy efforts 
have often derived from personal initiatives based on voluntarism and enthusiasm. 
Most of these initiatives have been neither institutionalized nor strategically planned 
before applying them. In the two government bodies, there are misunderstanding 
about what public diplomacy stands for, and insufficient knowledge of its 
mechanisms in the post-Cold War world, in which new communication dynamics 
have been emerged. The analysis showed that two major mindsets have dominated the 
practice of public diplomacy and strongly reflected in communication patterns 
followed by the two institutions: (1) authoritarianism; (2) bureaucracy. 
One of the main reasons behind the inability of the government institutions to 
reach and influence overseas populaces is the authoritarian mindset that controls their 
policies and actions. For many years, the Egyptian state media has followed the 
authoritarian theory that constitutes: blind commitment to the regime that usually 
wields central power and imposes restrictions on political freedoms (Siebert,1956; 
Severin & Tankard,1997; Fortner & Fackler, 2014).  It is true that after the January 
revolution, there were some expectations that Egyptian media could evolve towards a 
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more open and pluralistic landscape that would parallel the transition toward political 
change in the country (Khamis, 2011). However, the post-revolution regime seems to 
have been stricter on the media in which one-sided stories have been dominated and 
where dissident voices are almost absent in newspapers and TV shows (Abdulla, 
2014). In such an authoritarian atmosphere, the role and significance of public opinion 
are often marginalized, which contradicts the core of public diplomacy that is based 
on the role of public opinion in foreign policy making.  
Indeed, the authoritarian practices of the government have been strongly 
reflected in the way its institutions communicate with foreign publics.  The tendency 
to control information disseminated to publics lies evidently in the government 
initiatives to target foreign audiences. The problem is that the state does not 
differentiate between massages disseminated, to influence domestic population, and 
massages promoted to reach and engage foreign nations. The government institutions 
have applied similar manipulative mechanisms in their communications with both 
domestic and foreign audiences. These activities have been followed based on the 
premise that they can shape the global mentality toward the state's direction in the 
same way they control the mindset of their own ruled peoples to accept the state 
policies and actions. However, this communication policy has proven to be flawed as 
publics are always skeptical of foreign governments' words and actions, which create 
a need for more persuasive mechanisms of effective attraction and influence to reach 
minds and hearts of foreign publics (Nye, 2008; Heller& Persson, 2009). 
Like most autocratic regimes, the propagandistic approach has dominated the 
majority of information initiatives and advocacy campaigns promoted by the SIS and 
the MFA to target foreign audiences, particularly in the wake of the 30th June events. 
In their efforts to counter the West-supported Muslim Brotherhood narrative, the two 
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institutions promoted oratorical messages focusing on telling rather than proving 
through facts, symbols and actions. The paradigm of "your information vs. my 
information" was prevalent aiming to win arguments rather than engage in dialogue 
(Leaonard, 2002). However, the willingness to prove that you are right does not 
necessarily lead to change in the mind of target audiences. In short, the listening 
function has been always absent in any public diplomacy strategies applied by the two 
institution. This communication pattern can be attributed to the authoritarian nature of 
the regime, which has no real intent to listen.  
In addition, the blind commitment to the regime's trends and decisions harms 
the credibility of those institutions abroad. Instead of following stable communication 
policy driven from the country's foreign policy constants, the two government bodies 
chose to be a part of the state of flux and turmoil that has dominated the country since 
2011. The dramatic conversion in the tone and content of messaging that came with 
every regime change over the past five years has made any efforts to promote the 
government policies abroad insignificant and sometimes counterproductive. The 
feedback channels have always been absent in any overseas communication 
mechanisms applied by the two institutions. The role of opinion research in 
policymaking has been limited as there were limited tools providing a close reading of 
international public opinion inside the two institutions. Accordingly, the Egyptian 
messaging to the outside world has become irrelevant. As Anholt (2009) proposed, 
Egypt is still among the thirty most well-known countries around the world because it 
held a prestigious position, however it does not deserve such high profile anymore.  
The government’s monopoly over information is another aspect of the 
authoritarian mindset that undermines any public diplomacy efforts to influence 
foreign audiences. The analysis showed the lack of well-managed information 
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strategy in the two institutions in which the practices of covering up, absence of 
information, and delay in response have been characterize the government’s 
communication techniques with foreign media. Similarly, a report on the status of 
foreign journalists and correspondents in Egypt from 2011 to 2014 emphasized the 
lack of transparency and falsification of facts by the state agencies and officials in 
their communications with foreign media. According to the report, the government 
constraints over documented information is one of the major obstacles that undermine 
foreign reporting in Egypt (Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression, 
2015). The restricted access to information raises a question about the capacity of the 
government to influence international public opinion agenda as information and 
influence have always been correlated, in most studies, with public diplomacy and 
international agenda (Albritton& Manheim, 2006; Kelley, 2012; Zang& Camerion 
2003; Kiousis&Wu 2008; Curtain&Gaither 2004).  
Besides, the analysis proposes that differences in political values and social 
considerations appeared through communication with foreign cultures have 
complicated the practices of Egyptian public diplomacy and disturbed its mechanisms 
to manage the image of the county abroad. The prospects of enhancing the country's 
soft power capacities and the emergence of Egypt as an iconic model for peaceful 
revolution and democratic transition have globally declined in the wake of the 30th of 
June events.  For example, reinstalling a system of absolute power in post-Arab 
Spring Egypt has widened the gap between the Egyptian state and democracy-based 
Western societies. It is true that Western foreign policies are most probably driven by 
interests rather than values. However, the demands of persuasion are different for 
foreign publics than policy makers, which emphasizes a major distinction between 
public diplomacy and its traditional counterpart (Anhold, 2006; Hayden, 2007). 
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Foreign messaging usually passes through cultural filters that influence audiences’ 
interpretations based on their own values and norms (Sheafer& Gabay 2009; Curtin& 
Gaither 2004; Nye 2008). That might question the capacity of today's Egyptian state 
to promote its narrative to overseas publics, apart from the rhetoric of cultural 
relativism.  
On the other hand, the bureaucratic mindset dominated the performance of the 
two institutions is the second major source of deficiency that undermines the practice 
of Egyptian public diplomacy. The analysis showed that the two bodies have adopted 
a hierarchical model characterized based on a top-down and one-way approach, which 
complicates internal communications and causes delays in response to external 
updates and developments. Indeed, this hierarchical model might not be compatible 
with the new communication dynamics and recent realities of information 
technologies in the international arena. Much of those realities including free flow of 
information, interactivity aspects of new media, rise of non-state actors, the role of 
civil society and NGOs, were not considered –sometimes even denied- in the 
communication patterns adopted by the SIS and MFA to influence foreign audiences. 
However, a set of communication scholars in recent years have emphasized the 
emergence of new public diplomacy with different persuasive mechanisms and more 
effective strategies to reach overseas publics and manage the image of a county 
abroad, in accordance with the changing communication dynamics in the new 
international arena (Zaharna, 2007; Melissen,2005; Hocking; 2004;  Snow, 2009).  
The above conclusive remarks emphasize the need to rethink Egyptian public 
diplomacy and restructure its institutions to be more combatable with the new age of 
information and communication technologies. In the today's world, the practice of 
secret diplomacy with exclusive intergovernmental communications and confidential 
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information channels is hard to maintain, and even harder to influence.  Egyptian 
diplomacy should develop a new system, in which cooperation with civil society is 
emphasized and adopting more sophisticated communication strategies with feedback 
channels through listening functions is necessary. Otherwise, the continuation of such 
bureaucratic authoritarian trends of government propaganda could end up with a 
powerless state that is neither able to facilitate its interests in the international arena 
nor able to turn any global policies to its political advantage.  
In the following section, a set of recommendations will be introduced in a 
search for enhanced public diplomacy structure with more effective strategies to 
properly communicate with overseas publics and improve the image of the country 
abroad. The recommendations derived from both the literature presented first and the 
study's findings and analysis proposed later.  
Recommendations  
▪ Public diplomacy strategies should be set as a component of a wider strategy for 
image management of the country abroad. Any efforts to promote government 
policies and actions overseas should be harmonized with other national activities 
including trade, investment promotion, tourism, culture, sport, and talent 
recruitment. 
 
▪ The totality and unity of the Egyptian massaging to the outside world is essential. 
Without coordination with other stakeholders in the country including media, 
political parties and movements, civil society, NGOs, business companies and 
prominent individuals, the government efforts to promote itself to overseas 
populaces will be meaningless, irrelevant and sometimes counterproductive. 
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▪  Better understanding of public diplomacy objectives and functions should be 
reinforced in the state institutions. The government agencies should practice 
public diplomacy as a policy tool rather than a mere communication approach. 
Feedback channels and listening mechanisms should be provided in any public 
diplomacy strategies.  
  
▪ The philosophy behind the government overseas advocacy efforts and 
promotional campaigns should be radically changed. In cross-culture settings, the 
approach of "my information vs. your information" to win arguments is not the 
superlative way to persuade foreign publics. The government should adopt more 
open-minded, two-way communication strategies involving networking and 
relation-building activities to engage in real dialogues rather than delivering one-
way massages. 
  
▪  The government should dismiss its outdated and old-fashion propagandistic 
approach in which oratorical messages are disseminated and one-sided narratives 
are promoted to shape publics' mind toward the state direction. The Egyptian 
diplomacy should come up with more sophisticated communication mechanisms 
with effective persuasive capacities to reach the hearts and minds of overseas 
publics. This could materialize through verifying information rather than telling 
it. To capture the imagination of foreign audiences, the Egyptian public 
diplomacy should utilize evidence-based approaches involving rationalization 
through actions, symbols and facts.  
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▪ The government should differentiate between the massages disseminated to 
inform domestic population and the public diplomacy messaging promoted to 
target foreign audiences.  In cross-nation communications, differences in political 
values and cultural norms should be considered. That is why the Egyptian public 
diplomacy should design its overseas messaging in more comprehensible terms 
for different foreign cultures. However, the state’s messaging at home and abroad 
should be coordinated and harmonized to maintain the credibility and reputation 
of the government domestically and globally.  
 
▪ Reliance on reactive approaches in which tracing and correcting any bad 
mentions of the country in foreign media is the main function of overseas 
Egyptian communication officers, and is not enough to create favorable public 
opinion abroad. The government should depend on more proactive approaches, 
which is considered a far more advanced stage of public diplomacy. The 
Egyptian public diplomacy should preplan an overseas communication policy for 
each government action and decision. It is more influential and persuasive to 
create than to correct. The Egyptian public diplomats should work as actors, 
instead of being mere commentators or apologizers.  
 
▪ The government should develop a crisis-management strategy to communicate 
with the outside world in times of shocks and crises. One of the main lessons 
derived from the past five year of flux and turmoil in the country is the urgency to 
create rapid-response mechanisms to public diplomacy strategies in which 
budgetary flexibility and well-trained crisis teams are available. In the time of 
crisis, diplomatic efforts should be managed as a political campaign in which all 
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activities and actions are leveled, goal-oriented and well resourced. In addition, 
the coordination with allies and like-minded states is essential in such difficult 
times.  
                 
▪ Maintaining good relations with foreign reporters and resident correspondents 
through facilitating their work and providing them with an access to information 
should be an integral part of the government efforts to reach and influence mass 
audiences in other countries. The government should pay enough attention to the 
way domestic stories will be shaped in foreign media.  
 
▪  Egyptian public diplomacy structures, if any, should be reconstituted. A set of 
powerful institutions with sufficient budget allocations and qualified staffs should 
be established.  For example, there is a need to create an up-to-date, well-
resourced national media center in which new realities of information and 
communication technologies are applied. The center should be equipped with 
advanced tools of opinion polls and media monitoring to provide a regular 
reading of international public opinion and measure the global image of the 
country on a frequent basis.  
  
▪ The lack of full-capacity overseas communication officers should be honestly 
addressed, which could provide an opportunity for creating a new system to 
generate qualified public diplomats with linguistic and cultural fluency. 
Developing a separate career path for public diplomats, with a similar system of 
honors and distinctions like that of traditional diplomatic corps is recommended. 
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▪  The significance of the good representation of the country abroad should be 
reinforced among grass roots and ordinary citizens, as public diplomacy becomes 
everyone's business. The behavior of one Egyptian -whether an overseas student, 
an immigrant, or a tourist- plays a role in Egyptian public diplomacy.  
 
▪ Above all, one truth should be embraced in the state's mindset  that the finest and 
most successful public diplomacy in the world cannot save a failed policy. In 
other words, no matter how effective the marketing strategies are it would not be 
effective would the product be bad. Therefore, public diplomacy should have an 
influence at the planning stages of policies. Public diplomats become more 
effective if they have enough knowledge and power to prevent a bad policy from 
coming into force.  
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
      Although qualitative methods were the most appropriate to answer the research 
questions in this study, certain limitations inherent to qualitative research need to be 
addressed. Indeed the results of this study cannot be generalized  for two main 
reasons. First, the study focuses only on two institutions, the SIS and public 
diplomacy department in the MFA, particularly their headquarters at home. Second, 
the number of interviews was limited due to time and political  constraints. Despite 
the limitations, the study makes significant contribution to the research of public 
diplomacy in a non-western context by filling the gap in the literature that focuses 
mostly on the practice of public diplomacy in western world in which Arab 
countries are usually addressed as target rather than advocate nations. Moreover, 
This study advances a theoretical framework designed to apply agenda building 
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theory to government communications by finding a connection between strategies 
followed by public diplomacy institutions and agenda-building function of those 
institutions. 
 
      Future research can contribute to the further study of Egyptian public diplomacy 
by focusing on overseas performance through exploring strategies and techniques 
applied by Egyptian embassies and press offices abroad to reach and influence foreign 
publics. Although the home-based headquarters are usually the master mind behind 
communication patterns followed by overseas offices, case studies of  Egyptian 
embassies across the world  may help to better understand the cultural differences and 
their influence on public diplomacy models in various countries. Future studies may 
also extend to investigate the agenda-building function of cultural and educational 
institutions in the country and evaluate their role in cultural diplomacy and exchange 
programs with other countries, particularly in Africa and Middle East.  
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Appendix 1 
Interview Questions 
 
1- What is the definition of public diplomacy from Egyptian perspective? 
2- Is the term “Public Diplomacy" frequently used in the context of promoting Egypt 
abroad? 
3- What are the strategies you follow to promote Egypt abroad? 
4- Is there any kind of coordination between the government and NGOs to promote 
Egypt abroad? 
5- Do you use new media and social websites in your promotional efforts to improve 
the image of the country? 
6- Is there any kind of reliance on international PR companies to promote the 
country's policies and values abroad? 
7- How can Egypt promote its own narrative in international media? 
8- What is the role of culture difference in communicating with foreign audiences? 
9- What are the challenges that undermine your efforts to communicate with foreign 
publics? 
10- What are the recommendations you make to help improve the image of Egypt 
abroad?    
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     Appendix 2 
List of participants 
1) Ambassador Dr. Bader Abdel Atty, The spokesman of The Ministry of  Affairs, 
from June 2013 to August 2015 
2) Ambassador Salah Abdel Sadek ,The Former of the State Information Service 
(SIS), from December 2013 till now  
3) Ambassador Amgad Abdel Ghafar,The Former Chairman of the SIS 
4) Dr  Taha Abdel Aleem: The Former Chairman of the SIS 
5) Abdel Moaty Abu Zaid: the head of the foreign media division at the SIS 
6) Dr Ahmed Abu Elhassan: The Head of the Editing and Publishing Division at the 
SIS, the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Lebanon from 2009-
2013, the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Bahrain; from 2001 
to 2005.  
7) Attia Shkraan:  The head of the office of the  SIS chairman, and he was the head 
of the press office in the Egyptian Consulate in San Francisco from 2005-2009, 
press attaché at the Egyptian embassy in South Africa from 1997 to 2001, and 
press attaché at the Egyptian Consulate in San Francisco from 1989 to 1992  
8) Ayman Walash: Media Researcher at the SIS, and the coordinator of  Fact  Check 
Team  
9) Nagwa Hussein: Senior official at the foreign media division in the SIS, and she 
was the Head of the Press Office at the Egyptian Embassy in Switzerland 
10) Nabil Bakr: Senior official at the foreign media division in the SIS, and he was the 
head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Saudi Arabia  
11) Rasha Mohamed Ali: Senior official at the Foreign Media Division in the SIS, 
and she was the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Spain from 
2010  to 2014 
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12) Ramdan Korany: The editor in chief of "African Horizons" magazine issued by 
the SIS 
13) Dr. Ali Mahmoud Ali: Media researcher at the SIS and he was the head of the 
press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Algeria 
14) Nashwa Abdel Hamid: Senior official at the foreign media division in the SIS, 
and she was press attaché at the Egyptian Embassy in the USA ( March to July 
2002), the head of the press office in the Egyptian  Embassy in Australia (March to 
Augest 2003), press attaché in the Egyptian Embassy in UK (Augest 2003 to June 
2007), the head of the press office in the Egyptian Consulate in Los Anglos 
(November 2011 to February 2014), and the head of the press office in the 
Egyptian Embassy in Kampala from March to November 2014)  
15) Manal Elshabrawy: Senior official at the foreign media division at the SIS, and  
she was press attaché in the Egyptian embassy of UK from 2007-2011 
16) Basma Hafez: Senior official in the information division in the SIS, and she 
worked as a press attaché at the Egyptian Embassy in the USA from 1996-2000,  
and the head of the press office in  the Egyptian mission at the Unitized Nation  
(New York) from 2006-2010   
17) Ahmed Altenikhy: The head of the press office in Uganda from November 2014 
until now, and the head of the press office in Tunisia from October 2013 to 
November 2014.       
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 110 
Appendix 3 
 
Decree on the Establishment of the Information Department 
In the name of the Nation, 
President of the Republic, 
Having reviewed the decree of law No. 270 of 1952on the establishment of the 
Ministry of National Guidance, 
In accordance/e Minister of National Guidance has reviewed and having regard to 
the agreement of the Cabinet, 
We decree the following: 
Article 1 
 In the Ministry of National Guidance, a department entitled “Information 
Department” shall be established. Such Department shall comprise the general 
administration for Information and the administration of monitoring technical affairs. 
Article 11 
The Minister of National Guidance shall bring such decree into force. 
Issued in the Palace of the Republic on the 4th of Moharam 1374A.H. (corresponding 
to the 3rd of September, 1954) 
 (Mohammad Nageeb)      Major-General       (Military Staff). 
 Minister of National Guidance 
Prime Minister 
Salah-El-Deen Mostafa Salem (Major Military Staff) 
(Gamal Abd-El- Nasser Hussien) Lieutenant-Colonel (Military Staff) 
 A duplicate shall be sent to the Minister of National Guidance to come into force.                                                                                                                                                                          
   Signature Prime Minister 
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4 Appendix 
 
 
Decree No. 1820 of 1967 on the Establishment of the SIS 
President of the Republic, 
Having considered the Constitution 
Law No. 308 of 1955 on Administration Attachment, 
Law No. 61 of 1963 promulgating the Law of General Authorities, 
Law No. 46 of 1946 on the system of Civil Servants, 
The presidential decree No. 3718 of 1965 on organizing the sector of Culture, 
National Guidance, Tourism and Antiquities, 
The presidential decree No. 76 of 1966 on organizing the Ministry of National Guidance, 
We decree the following: 
Article I 
A general authority entitled State Information Service “SIS” shall be established and 
shall have an artificial character. Such authority shall be affiliated to the Minister of 
National Guidance and shall be subject to the supervision, censorship and directives 
thereof. 
Article II 
SIS shall aim at contributing to realizing the mission of the Ministry of National 
Guidance in the fields of examining domestic and world public opinion concerning 
issues and events that concern the state, in addition to guiding, directing and 
enlightening the domestic public opinion by using direct means of communication, as 
well as in the field of Information and the enlightenment of the world public opinion 
by using the different means in accordance with the information plans agreed upon. 
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SIS may realize such objective work in cooperation with all the concerned agencies of 
the State, particularly the other information agencies, the Arab Socialist Union 
agencies, and the State’s agencies abroad. 
SIS in particular, may: 
1-Organize obtaining information on different subjects, events and issues that concern 
public opinion at home and abroad, collecting, categorizing, studying and analyzing 
such information to extract the different trend thereof. The results thereof shall be 
reported to the bodies concerned, particularly the agencies of the agencies of the 
Ministry of Guidance in a way that may allow planning  and drawing the policy  of  
information according to real situation of  the trends of the domestic and world public 
opinion, 
2-Follow up the reactions and trends of domestic and world public opinion towards 
the media programs presented by the state in connection with the masses of the 
people. Such follow up shall be carried out via the domestic and foreign agencies of 
SIS with the assistance of all the agencies of the State at home and abroad, 
3-Prepare and implement information programs that are directed to domestic public 
opinion in accordance with the decided policy and plans aiming to enhance and 
deepen socialist concepts among the public categories, boost the exerted efforts for 
realizing the civilizational level of the village, realize the continuous link between the 
people and the leadership thereof , convey the philosophy of the national work to all 
employees, make the citizens aware of the State’s policies, trend and resolutions, and 
contribute to highlighting the national occasions and other similar aims that relate to 
guiding  and directing the masses of the people via using means of direct 
communication through the activities of the stable and mobile domestic information 
centers such as holding direct meetings and issuing publications, photos, as well as 
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displaying stickers, slides and documentary films, in addition to broadcasting 
documentary cassettes and the likes of the means of direct communication with the 
masses of the people. 
4- Prepare and implement the information programs directed to the world public 
opinion according to the decided information policies and plans in order to inform 
such world public opinion of the objectives, the socialist and the trends of the United 
Arab Republic towards the world problems in addition to the extent of rise achieved 
thereby. The programs shall refute counterclaims in addition to the other objectives 
that aim to enlighten the world public opinion by using direct and public means of 
communication through the information centers and the State agencies abroad, 
5- Prepare and edit informational booklets and publications which have the general 
characteristic and contain what concerns the world and the local public opinion, 
including the different trends, categories and levels thereof on the current subjects and 
events in addition to the public trends there towards in order to show the aspects of 
the development and the rise of the republic, also to face the effects of such 
counterclaims, 
6- Prepare and edit informational publications and reports specialized in political, 
economic and social subjects that concern the supreme authorities of the State, 
7- Prepare the informational materials including printed publications, stickers, photos, 
recording slides, documentary films, and other materials necessary to carry out the 
decided internal and external informational programs in accordance with such plans 
and programs, and in pursuance of the decided rates, 
8- Work on making and strengthening the bonds with the peoples of other states by 
providing the authorities, individuals and foreigners with media information and 
materials in response to the desires and questions thereof. Also, provide the sons of 
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the United Arab Republic, the friendly countries, and envoys with the media 
information and materials in order to show the trends of the Republic and the aspects 
of development therein; in addition to confront the counterclaims. 
9- Offer help for journalists, corresponding the like including residing and visiting 
foreign businessmen in order to know the realistic and the trends of the state 
concerning the events as well as the internal and external issues. 
10- Implement the laws and regulations related to journalism and the publication of 
news as well as statements, news and the like including what is entrusted to the 
Ministry of National Guidance concerning local press affairs. 
 
Article III 
The Board of Directors of the SIS shall be constituted as follows; 
 -A Board Chairman; a presidential decree shall be issued to appoint and specify the       
bonuses thereof. 
 - Six members; the Minister of National Guidance shall issue a decree for the 
assignment thereof for a renewable term of three years. 
 
Article IV  
The Board of Directors of the SIS shall be the dominating power of the affairs thereof 
that shall deal with the matters thereof, set the policies that shall be followed thereby, 
and adopt the decrees regarded thereby necessary to achieve the purpose items 
established therefor and thereto, in particular: 
1- Issuing resolutions and internal regulations; in addition to the decisions concerning 
the financial, administrative, and technical affairs of SIS without being restricted to 
the governmental rules, 
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2- Enacting regulations concerning the appointment, promotion, transference and 
dismissal of the workers of SIS; in addition to the determination of the salaries, 
bonuses and pensions thereof, 
3- Approving the annual budget draft, 
4- Proposing international agreements and treaties concerning the SIS, 
5- Proposing making loans for the benefit of the SIS, 
6- Proposing and specifying the duties, tariffs and salaries for the kinds of services 
presented by the SIS. 
7- Considering all that shall be regarded by the Minister of National Guidance or the 
Board Chairman to be set forth, concerning matters included within the 
competency of the SIS. The Board of Directors may form a committee or more, 
composed of the members thereof and entrust thereto some of the competencies 
thereof. The Board may delegate a member or a director of the SIS to perform a 
certain mission. 
 
Article V 
The Board Chairman shall take charge of managing the SIS, dealing with the affairs 
thereof, and representing the SIS in the relations thereof with other persons and before 
the judiciary. Also, the Board Chairman shall be responsible for the implementation 
of the objective general policy in order to achieve the purpose of SIS, and may entrust 
a director or more with some of the jurisdictions thereof. 
 
Article VI 
The Board of Directors shall meet at least once every month by virtue of a call by the 
Chairman thereof. The Minister of the National Guidance may call the Board to order 
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whenever regarded necessary. The meeting shall not be true or correct provided that 
the majority of members shall be present. Decrees shall be issued by the majority of 
the presents. In case of parity, preference shall be given to the side of the Chairman. 
 
Article VII 
Minutes of meetings and texts of decrees shall be recorded and signed by the Board 
Chairman and the Secretary of the session. 
 
Article VIII 
The Board Chairman of SIS shall submit the resolutions of the Board to the Minister 
of National Guidance in order to be attested. The same Minister shall submit to the 
President of the Republic all the matters that need a presidential decree to be issued 
thereby. 
 
Article IX 
The present workers in the cancelled information Department shall be transferred to 
the SIS with the same degrees, salaries and bonuses thereof. 
 
Article X  
 SIS shall have a separate budget prepared according to the rules proposed by the 
Central Agency of Organization and Administration in agreement with the Ministry of 
Treasury. 
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Article XI  
SIS may carry out the procedures stipulated in Law No. 308 of 1955, mentioned 
herein, to take the rights thereof. 
Article XII 
The Ministry of National Guidance shall take charge of the competencies of the Board 
of Directors of the SIS until the Board is formed 
Article XIII 
Systems and rules applied in the cancelled Information Department shall remain 
applicable until the SIS shall issue the internal, financial and administrative 
regulations thereof. 
Article XIV 
Such decree shall be published in the official gazette and shall come into force as of 
the date of publication thereof. 
 Issued in the Presidency on the Fifth of Ragab 1387 A.H (correspondent to October, 
19, 1967). 
Shall be sent to the Minister of National Guidance, the Secretary- General of the 
State.  
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Appendix 5 
 
